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On December 31, 2020, 
37-year-old Calgary
Police Service Sergeant 
Andrew Harnett was 
killed in the line of duty. 
At about 10:50 p.m., 
S e r g e a n t H a r n e t t 
conducted a traffic stop in the area of 
Falconridge Boulevard and Falconridge 
Drive  N.E. During the traffic stop, the 
vehicle fled, striking Sergeant Harnett in 
the process. Other officers were nearby 
and rendered aid as quickly as possible, 
while EMS rushed to their side. Paramedics 
and fellow officers fought to save his life, 
but he was pronounced deceased at 
hospital.  
Sergeant Harnett served with the Calgary 
Police Service for 12 years after first joining 
the military police. He was a passionate 
sports fan, loved NFL football - especially 
the Miami Dolphins - and was a loyal 
Hamilton Tiger-Cats fan. Sergeant Harnett 
and his spouse were expecting their first 
child in the summer of 2021. 
Source: Calgary police officer killed in the line of duty and Harnett Family Statement.
"He knew the risks 
of the job and 
showed up everyday 
regardless."
Harnett Family Statement
~ Sergeant Andrew Harnett~
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Law Enforcement Studies Diploma
Be the one making a difference  and keeping 
communities safe. If you want to gain the applied 
skills to be a sought-after graduate pursuing a 
rewarding career in law enforcement and public 
safety, then this program is for you.
Click Here
Law Enforcement Studies Degree
If you have a relevant diploma, and are interested in 
obtaining an applied degree to pursue a law 
enforcement or public  safety career, then this 
program is for you. This program builds on previous 
relevant studies with an applied degree, and is 
designed to increase your chances of success.
Click Here
Post-Baccalaureate Diploma in 
Disaster Management
Be the one in a dynamic and growing field keeping 
communities safe. If you have a bachelor's degree 
and are interested in pursuing and advancing your 
career in the fields of disaster and emergency 
management, this program is for you.
Click Here
Certificate in Emergency 
Management
Be the one advancing  your career. If you are 
interested in a career in emergency management, 
currently work as an emergency manager, or are a 
first responder or public safety  professional looking 
to move into an emergency management role, this 
program is for you.
Click Here
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
5 day weekend: freedom to make your life and 
work rich with purpose.
Nik Halik & Garrett B. Gunderson.
Austin, TX: Bard Press, 2017.
G 179 H35 2017
Exercise-based interventions for mental illness: 
physical activity as part of clinical treatment.
edited by Brendon Stubbs & Simon Rosenbaum.
London, UK; San Diego, CA: Elsevier: Academic 
Press, 2018.
RC 455.2 E947 E94 2018
Evil: the science behind humanity's dark side.
Julia Shaw.
Toronto, ON: Doubleday Canada, 2019.
BF 789 E94 S53 2019
Fundamental justice: section 7 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Hamish Stewart.
Toronto, ON: Irwin Law, 2019.
KE 4381.5 S74 2019
Great at work: how top performers do less, work 
better, and achieve more.
Morten T. Hansen.
New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2018.
HD 57 H356 2018
Lead with a story: a guide to crafting business 
narratives that captivate, convince, and inspire.
Paul Smith.
New York, NY: American Management Association, 
2012.
HD 30.3 S5774 2012
The mediator's toolkit: formulating and asking 
questions for successful outcomes.
Gerry O'Sullivan.
Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers, 2018.
HM 1126 O885 2018
Mental: everything you never knew you needed 
to know about mental health.
Dr. Steve Ellen & Catherine Deveny.
London, UK: Head of Zeus, 2018.
RA 790 E44 2018
Never enough: the neuroscience and experience 
of addiction.
Judith Grisel.
New York, NY: Doubleday, 2019.
RC 564 G75 2019
The PTSD workbook: simple, effective techniques 
for overcoming traumatic stress symptoms.
Mary Beth Williams, PhD, LCSW, CTS & Soili 
Poijula, PhD.
Oakland, CA: New Harbinger Publications, Inc., 
2016.
RC 552 P67 W544 2016
Simplify work: crushing complexity to liberate 
innovation, productivity, and engagement.
Jesse W. Newton.
New York, NY: Morgan James Publishing, 2019.
HD 58.9 N48 2019
Skin in the game: hidden asymmetries in daily 
life.
Nassim Nicholas Taleb.
New York, NY: Random House, 2018.
HM 1101 T35 2018
Teaching, coaching and mentoring adult learners: 
lessons for professionalism and partnership.
edited by Heather Fehring & Susan Rodrigues.
Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, an 
imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, 2017.
LC 5225 L42 T43 2017
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BCFirstRespondersMentalHealth.com
IT’S TIME TO SPEAK UP ABOUT MENTAL HEALTH.
















































For more resources on better understanding mental health in the context of the 
experiences and pressures of first responders, as well as the broader population, 
visit the following link.
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BC’s MINISTRY OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY RELEASES POLICE DOG 
STATISTICS
In late 2020 the Policing and Security Branch of 
BC’s Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General 
released data reported to the Director of Police 
Services on the use of Police  Service Dogs (PSD) for 
2019. 
The total number of PSD locations, 
apprehensions and arrests. This 
included 1,062 by the RCMP and 
LMIPDS followed by  the Vancouver Police (505), 
Victoria Police (55), Saanich Police (55) and West 
Vancouver Police (26). 
The total number of subjects bitten by 
a PSD. A bite is defined as “a police 
dog’s use of mouth and teeth to grab or 
hold a person’s body or clothes”. The RCMP and 
LMIPDS accounted for 183 bites, followed by 
Vancouver (101), Victoria (4), West Vancouver (1) 
and Saanich (2). There were nine non-subject 
civilians and 10 non-subject police officers bitten.
The total number of tracks or 
searches for suspects . This 
included 3,901 by the  RCMP and 
LMIPDS. Vancouver (965), Saanich (109), Victoria 
(92) and West Vancouver (34) followed.
The total number of apprehensions 
by bite or display. There were 926 
apprehensions made by the RCMP 
and LMIPDS, while Vancouver made 515, followed 
by Victoria (52), Saanich (27) and West Vancouver 
(26).
The total number of tracks or searches 
for missing persons. 
The total number of searches for drugs. 
This included 321 by the RCMP and 
LMIPDS followed by Victoria  (31), 
Vancouver (4) and West Vancouver (1).
The total number of searches for 
explosives or firearms. There were 
281 by the RCMP and LMIPDS, while 
Vancouver made (43). Transit Police (31) and 
Victoria (21) followed.
The total number of searches for 
evidence. This included 1,046 by 
the RCMP and LMIPDS followed by 
Vancouver (41), Victoria (40), Saanich (25) and 
West Vancouver (10).
The total number of community 
relations or other events using a PSD. 
This included 159 by the RCMP and 
LMIPDS followed by Transit (60), Victoria (40), 
Vancouver (38), Saanich (19) and  West Vancouver 
(4).
The total number 
of crowd control 
uses involving a 
PSD. This is down from 









Abbotsford, Delta, New Westminster, and Port Moody form part of the 
RCMP Lower Mainland Integrated Police Dog Service (LMIPDS). 
320
0
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PSD Locations, Apprehensions & Arrests
Police Agency 2016 2017 2018 2019
RCMP & LMIPDS 2,484 2,113 1,739 1,062
Vancouver 583 555 522 505
Victoria 91 56 53 55
Saanich 23 34 32 55
West Vancouver 30 25 22 26
Total 3,211 2,783 2,368 1,703
PSD Bites
Police Agency 2016 2017 2018 2019
RCMP & LMIPDS 221 213 248 183
Vancouver 166 99 111 101
Victoria 11 7 11 4
Saanich 5 1 0 2
West Vancouver 1 6 3 1
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POLICE FIREARM DISCHARGES 
RISE
In 2019 there were 15 firearm discharge incidents 
in an operational setting as reported by BC police. 
Two incidents arose from independent police 
agencies while 13 were reported by  the RCMP. This 
is up 200% from 2018, when only five such 




Police Firearm Discharge Incidents 
Operational  Setting







POLICE AGENCY FIREARM DISPLAYS
(NUMBER OF SUBJECTS/EDP)
2019 EDP %EDP
RCMP 900 141 16%
Vancouver 533 107 20%
Victoria 119 26 22%
Abbotsford 88 10 11%
New Westminster 42 5 12%
Delta 41 6 15%
West Vancouver 33 6 18%
Transit 26 3 12%
Port Moody 17 2 12%
Saanich 12 4 33%
Central Saanich 7 1 14%
Nelson 4 0 0%
Oak Bay 3 1 33%
Stl’atl’imx 2 0 0%
Total 1827 312 17%
Police Firearm Discharge Incidents / Persons Killed and Injured
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Total
Discharges 16 13 29 9 9 10 10 17 12 9 14 5 15 168
Killed 4 0 8 3 4 4 1 6 7 4 2 3 4 50
Injured 3 5 9 2 1 2 4 4 4 5 5 1 4 49
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BC’s INTERMEDIATE WEAPON 
USE STATISTICS RELEASED
In November 2020, the Policing and Security 
Branch of BC’s Ministry  of Public Safety and 
Solicitor General released the intermediate weapon 
use and data reported by BC police agencies for 
2012-2019. 
The total number of Extended Range 
Impact Weapon (ERIW) discharges by 
police (number of subjects). This is up 
from 59 in 2018 and 41 in 2017.
103 POLICE AGENCY 
ERIW DISCHARGES
(NUMBER OF SUBJECTS)
Jurisdiction 2018 2019 Change
Vancouver 27 67 +148%
Abbotsford 10 14 +40%
Victoria 5 12 +140%
RCMP 11 10 -9%
Others 6 0 -
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The percentage of ERIW Discharges 
by police where the subject of 
d i s c h a r g e w a s l i s t e d a s a n 
“emotionally disturbed person” (EDP). 
The total number of ERIW Displays by 
police (number of subjects). Of these 
subjects, 28% were listed as EDP. 
The total number of Conducted 
Energy Weapon (CEW) Discharges by 
police (number of subjects). This is up 
from 255 in 2018 and 252 in 2017.
The percentage of Conducted Energy 
Weapon (CEW) Discharges by police 
where  the subject of discharge was 




POLICE AGENCY 2018 2019 Change
RCMP 181 199 +9.9%
Vancouver 47 65 +38%
Victoria 11 14 +27%
Abbotsford 1 7 +600%
Delta 1 1 0%
Nelson 2 1 -50%
New Westminster 2 1 -50%
Saanich 3 1 -67%
Others 7 0 -





POLICE AGENCY 2019 EDP %EDP
Vancouver 272 70 26%
Abbotsford 32 4 13%
Victoria 24 5 21%
RCMP 21 11 52%
Delta 11 4 36%
New Westminster 10 5 50%
West Vancouver 5 5 100%
Saanich 4 3 75%
Oak Bay 2 1 50%
Port Moody 2 1 50%









POLICE AGENCY 2019 EDP %EDP
Vancouver 67 34 51%
Abbotsford 14 7 50%
Victoria 12 6 50%
RCMP 10 8 80%
Total 103 55 53%
109
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T h e t o t a l 
n u m b e r o f 
O l e o r e s i n 
Capsicum (OC) Spray 
Discharges by police 
(number of subjects). This 






POLICE AGENCY 2018 2019 Change
RCMP 141 120 -14.9%
Vancouver 39 49 +26%
Abbotsford 13 21 +62%
Victoria 22 18 -18%
Transit 4 4 0%
New Westminster 1 2 +100%
West Vancouver 3 2 -33%
Delta 0 1 -
Central Saanich 0 1 -
Others 7 0 -
Total 230 218 -5.2%
CEW DISCHARGES
(NUMBER OF SUBJECTS/EDP)
POLICE AGENCY 2019 EDP %EDP
RCMP 199 104 52%
Vancouver 65 33 51%
Victoria 14 8 57%
Abbotsford 7 4 57%
Delta 1 1 100%
Nelson 1 0 0%
New Westminster 1 1 100%
Saanich 1 1 100%
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The pe rcen tage o f OC Spray 
Discharges by police where the 
subject of discharge was listed as EDP. 
The percentage of OC Spray Displays 
by police where the subject of 
discharge was listed as EDP. 
The total number of 
Baton Applications by 
police (number of 
subjects). This was down from 
72 in 2018.
The percentage of Baton Applications 
by police where the  subject of 




POLICE AGENCY 2019 EDP %EDP
Abbotsford 2 0 0%
Saanich 2 1 50%
Transit 2 1 50%
Vancouver 6 0 0%
Victoria 10 5 50%
RCMP 7 2 29%
Total 29 9 31%
-5.6%OC SPRAY DISCHARGES(NUMBER OF SUBJECTS/EDP)
POLICE AGENCY 2019 EDP %EDP
RCMP 120 41 34%
Vancouver 49 9 18%
Abbotsford 21 7 33%
Victoria 18 10 56%
Transit 4 3 75%
New Westminster 2 0 0%
West Vancouver 2 0 0%
Delta 1 1 100%
Central Saanich 1 0 0%






POLICE AGENCY 2018 2019 Change
Vancouver 35 43 +23%
RCMP 11 15 +36%
Abbotsford 5 4 +20%
Transit 7 3 -57%
West Vancouver 6 2 -67%
Delta 2 1 -50%
Others 6 0 -
Total 72 68 -5.6%
BATON APPLICATIONS
(NUMBER OF SUBJECTS)
POLICE AGENCY 2019 EDP %EDP
Vancouver 43 11 26%
RCMP 15 5 33%
Abbotsford 4 1 25%
Transit 3 3 100%
West Vancouver 2 2 100%
Delta 1 0 0%
Total 68 22 32%
32%
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Most Preferred Intermediate Weapon
In 2019, the CEW was the intermediate weapon 
most often used by police (289). This was followed 
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BC CEW DISCHARGE DATA 2019
RCMP Non-RCMP Total 
# of CEWs 1,928 493 2,421
# of CEW certified officers 1,928 966 2,894
CEW discharges 199 90 289
Effective discharges 155 69 224
Probe discharges 170 52 222
Contact stun discharges 22 23 45
Probe+Contact stun discharges 7 15 22
1 Cycle cases 118 58 176
2 Cycle cases 60 22 82
3 Cycle cases 21 10 31
Subject Characteristics for Discharges
Male subjects 187 86 273
Female subjects 12 4 16
Under 18 years of age 7 1 8
18-69 years of age 192 89 281
70 years of age and older 0 0 0
Under influence drugs/alcohol 130 47 177
Emotionally disturbed 104 48 152
Armed with weapons 115 50 165
Injuries for discharges
Probes broke skin 132 53 185
Subjects with non-trivial injury 14 15 29
Deaths proximal to discharge
(proximal does not mean “caused by”)
2 0 2
Officers with non-trivial injury 0 8 8
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ROADSIDE DENIAL OF ACCESS 
TO COUNSEL A SERIOUS 
CHARTER VIOLATION
R. v. Landry, 2020 NBCA 72
After being stopped driving by police 
at 2:48 a.m., an officer detected an 
odour of alcohol on the accused’s 
breath. The accused admitted to 
having consumed some alcohol and 
an approved screening device (ASD) demand was 
made for a breath sample at 2:55 a.m. But he 
refused to exit his vehicle. After three orders to get 
out and an obstruction warning, the accused exited 
his vehicle while holding his cell phone. The officer 
told the accused to leave his cell phone in the 
vehicle or it would be seized. On the accused’s 
sixth attempt to provide a  sample, after being told 
of the consequences of refusing to comply, he 
registered a fail. At 3:15 a.m. the accused was 
arrested and informed of his s. 10(b) Charter right 
to counsel. 
The accused told the officer he had a lawyer and 
wanted to speak with him immediately  using his 
cell phone. But the officer refused to let the 
accused call right away. They arrived at the station 
at 3:40 am, and several unsuccessful attempts were 
made to contact a lawyer (see event grid). Then, at 
4:34 am, the accused was given the following 
Prosper warning:
You have already been informed of your right 
to contact duty counsel or another lawyer. You 
have clearly indicated that you want to talk to 
a lawyer, but you have changed your mind (or 
you have not clearly indicated to me whether 
you want to talk to a lawyer). 
You have the right to a reasonable 
opportunity to contact a lawyer for advice 
and, before obtaining evidence from you, I am 
required to wait until you exercise or waive 
that right. Do you want to waive your right to 
contact duty counsel or another lawyer? 
EVENT GRID
Time Event 
2:48 a.m. Vehicle stop.
2:55 a.m. ASD demand made.
3:00 a.m. - 
3:10 a.m. 5 unsuccessful attempts made to blow in device. 
On 6th attempt accused registered a “fail”.
3:15 a.m.
Accused arrested and informed of s. 10(b) Charter 
rights. Accused replied he had a lawyer and wanted to 
consult him immediately on his cell phone. Police told 
the accused he would have to wait until arrival at the 
police station.
3:40 a.m. Accused arrived at police station.
3:45 a.m.
Police officer dialled the accused’s lawyer of choice’s 
office number (Mr. Mallet) at the accused’s request. 
There was no answer. 
3:55 a.m.
Police retrieved the accused’s cell phone to obtain Mr. 
Mallet’s personal number. While the phone was being 
retrieved, further calls to Mr. Mallet’s office went 
unanswered.
4:13 a.m. Accused was handed his cell phone to obtain Mr. Mallet's personal number.
4:14 a.m.
Police dialled Mr. Mallet’s personal number using station  
phone. There was no answer. Police left a message 
requesting a return call.
4:16 a.m.
Police made a second attempt to reach Mr. Mallet at his 
personal number. Accused left a message for Mr. Mallet.
Suggesting Mr. Mallet might be abroad, the accused 
asked to contact a second lawyer of choice, Mr. 
LeBlanc. The police officer dialled Mr. LeBlanc’s office 
number and an answering message said Mr. LeBlanc’s 
office would be closed for five days.
4:22 a.m.
Accused found another lawyer’s number in his cell 
phone (Mr. Boudreau). Police called Mr. Boudreau’s cell 
phone number and left a message.
4:27 a.m.
Accused dialled Mr. Boudreau’s cell phone number from 
the station phone. There was no answer. Accused left a 
message asking for a call back.
Police suggested accused speak to a legal aid lawyer. 
Accused agreed, provided he could speak to a lawyer 
named Mr. Roy, who he knew well.
4:30 a.m.
Police called legal aid. The legal aid office dispatcher 
told police that Ms. Landry was the on-call duty counsel. 
The accused did not know her and refused to speak to 
her. Police tried unsuccessfully to reach Mr. Roy.
4:33 a.m. Accused, using his cell phone, tried to call Mr. Roy.
4:34 a.m. Accused given Prosper warning.
4:38 a.m. Qualified breath technician took charge of accused.
4:45 a.m. Accused provided first breath sample. 
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The accused replied, “I do not waive it, but what 
do you want me to do?”  Within four minutes he 
was then turned over to the qualified technician 
who took two breath samples. The first sample was 
taken at 4:45 am.
New Brunswick Provincial Court
The judge found the  accused had been 
provided a reasonable opportunity to 
consult a lawyer but had not been 
diligent in exercising his right. Thus, the 
Prosper  warning did not matter. He was convicted 
of operating a motor vehicle while over 80mg%. 
New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench 
The appeal judge found the accused’s s. 
10(b) Charter right was breached. 
Although he too found a Prosper 
warning unnecessary, he held the 
investigating officer did not provide the accused 
with a reasonable opportunity to retain and instruct 
counsel without delay at the time of his arrest.  As a 
consequence, the certificate of analysis was 
excluded under s. 24(2) and the accused was 
acquitted. 
New Brunswick Court of Appeal
The Crown challenged the 
finding of a s. 10(b) Charter 
breach. But the Court of 
Appeal rejected the Crown’s 
arguments. In this case, the  Court of Appeal 
recognized there were two s. 10(b) violations. 
s. 10(b) Right to Counsel 
Justice LeBlond, delivering  the opinion for the 
Court of Appeal, described the s. 10(b) right as 
follows:
... [T]he case law could not be clearer on the 
issue of when an accused is entitled to avail 
himself or herself of his or her right to counsel. 
The right applies immediately following arrest 
and reading of constitutional rights, insofar as 
the circumstances of the case allow. No 
evidence may be obtained before the right is 
exercised. The Supreme Court of Canada 
clearly stated ... that the right requires the 
police officer to allow the accused to use any 
available telephone. ....
 
The reason why the exercise of the right must 
be allowed as soon as possible is to achieve the 
overarching purpose of s. 10(b), that of avoiding 
involuntary incrimination. The purpose is 
achieved only when the detainee is in a 
position to receive legal advice. [references 
omitted, paras. 19-20]
In this case, there were  two s. 10(b) Charter 
breaches. 
1. The initial refusal by the officer at the time of 
arrest to permit access to counsel was the first 
breach. The accused had immediately expressed 
the desire to contact his lawyer, but “the police 
officer’s usual practice ... prevented [the 
accused] from availing himself of his right to 
retain and instruct counsel at the scene of his 
arrest, despite the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
explicit and well-known instructions to that 
effect, dating back more than thirty-three 
years,” Justice LeBlond said. Although the 
accused told the officer he wanted to consult his 
lawyer without delay by using his cell phone, he 
was not provided any means to exercise that 
right. He was told he would have to wait until 
they arrived at the police station. “In this case, 
[the accused] was entitled to use his cell phone 
to try to contact his lawyer, but the police 
officer refused to let him do so,” said Justice 
LeBlond. “He went so far as to threaten [the 
“[T]he case law could not be clearer on the issue of when an accused is entitled to 
avail himself or herself of his or her right to counsel. The right applies 
immediately following arrest and reading of constitutional rights, insofar as the 
circumstances of the case allow.” 
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accused] that his cell phone would be seized if 
he did not leave it in his car.” 
2. The second breach occurred when the accused 
was read the Prosper warning. The Prosper 
warning is to be given when a detainee, who 
has asserted a  desire to speak to counsel, 
changes their mind and waives their right to 
counsel (or does not respond clearly  to a police 
officer). Neither of these situations applied here. 
“[The accused] never waived his right and, 
moreover, he was completely  unaware of the 
legal import of the Prosper warning,” said 
Justice LaBlond. “The warning makes no 
reference to the attempts made until it was 
read and simply  informs [the accused] that his 
right under s. 10(b) of the Charter subsists and 
that he continues to have a reasonable 
opportunity to contact a lawyer. All [the 
accused] can be expected to understand from 
the warning is that the police officer is telling 
him, at 4:34 a.m., that he still has a reasonable 
opportunity to exercise  his right and that the 
police  officer has to wait until he does so 
before  obtaining, in this case, samples of his 
breath.” 
Furthermore, the two-hour time limit related to the 
statutory presumption of the BAC level, did not 
influence the timing of when the accused was 
turned over to the qualified breath technician, a 
mere four (4) minutes after receiving the Prosper 
warning. “There were thirty minutes left before 
the end of the period within which to benefit from 
the presumption,” said Justice LeBland. “It is 
therefore difficult to explain the police officer’s 
decision to so hastily deprive [the accused] of his 
right, especially since the officer had just told him 
he was not required to exercise his right within a 
specified time provided he was reasonably 
diligent. Certainly, the loss of the presumption 
could not prevail over [the accused’s] right.”   The 
accused was not permitted to exercise, within a 
reasonable time, his right to counsel before the 
qualified technician took charge of him
s. 24(2) Charter
The Court of Appeal went on to uphold the Court 
of Queen’s Bench decision to exclude the 
certificate of analysis. Although the  evidence was 
reliable  and society’s interest in an adjudication of 
this case on its merits favoured the admission of 
the certificate of analysis, the other two factors in 
the s. 24(2) analysis favoured exclusion. First, the 
officer’s usual practice – not allowing access to 
counsel at the place of arrest and waiting for arrival 
at the police station – was  a very serious Charter-
infringement. 
“In the case at bar, the police  officer testified he 
acted in accordance with his usual practice, but 
there is no evidence he engaged in conduct he 
believed was required by law,”  said LeBlond. “I 
cannot conceive that the RCMP, with all its 
resources and means of communicating with its 
members, would not have alerted its members 
about how they should conduct themselves, 
especially in light of the fact that the  expected 
conduct was established by Canada’s highest court 
more than thirty years ago.” Second, the two s. 
10(b) breaches undermined the accused’s right to 
counsel and were “committed deliberately and 
egregiously”.  
The Crown’s leave to appeal was denied.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“In the case at bar, the police officer testified he acted in accordance with his 
usual practice, but there is no evidence he engaged in conduct he believed was 
required by law. I cannot conceive that the RCMP, with all its resources and 
means of communicating with its members, would not have alerted its members 
about how they should conduct themselves, especially in light of the fact that the 
expected conduct was established by Canada’s highest court more than thirty 
years ago.” 
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NO DETENTION UNTIL 
ALCOHOL DETECTED ON 
BREATH
R. v. Pawson, 2021 BCCA 22
The accused lost control of his 
vehicle, swerved into the oncoming 
lane and off the road, and struck a 
pedestrian who had just gotten off a 
bus. Another bus rider immediately 
ran to the pedestrian, who was lying in a bush, 
moaning, and in a semiconscious state. Emergency 
911 was called, and firefighters, paramedics and 
police were dispatched to the scene. 
At 8:07 p.m. a police officer was dispatched to 
attend. At 8:12 p.m. she arrived on scene. 
Firefighters and paramedics were already there. The 
officer saw a grey vehicle in the ditch area, which 
she believed had been involved in an accident with 
the pedestrian.  The accused was standing at the 
front of the vehicle looking at the injured 
pedestrian.   The fire chief pointed out the accused 
as the driver involved in the accident.
The officer approached the accused and asked him 
if he was the driver. He said, “Yes, I am” and gave 
her his name.  The accused was emotional and 
appeared very concerned about the pedestrian.  
The officer, concerned about the accused’s 
emotional state and wanting to find out what had 
happened, asked the accused to follow her to her 
police vehicle parked a short distance away. 
Because the accused appeared “fairly shaken up”, 
the officer told the accused he could sit down on 
the back seat of her vehicle. When he did so, his 
legs and feet were outside the police vehicle. The 
officer asked the accused for his driver’s licence 
and used her portable radio to check his name and 
date of birth.
The accused told the officer he had spent some 
time on his boat and was driving home when the 
accident happened.   Because  of the noise from the 
firefighters and paramedics, the officer leaned 
towards the accused to hear him.  When she did so
— at about 8:14 p.m. — she detected the slight 
smell of alcohol coming from his breath as he was 
speaking. When asked whether he had any  alcohol 
that day, the accused replied he had a beer at 5:00 
p.m. Suspecting the accused had operated a motor 
vehicle within the preceding three hours with 
alcohol in his body, the officer made an ASD 
demand (under then s. 254(2) Criminal Code) at 
about 8:18 p.m. The accused failed the test and he 
was arrested at 8:22 p.m. for impaired driving 
causing bodily harm. He was advised of his Charter 
rights and a breath demand was made. He was 
taken to the police station where he spoke to a 
lawyer. Two breath samples were taken resulting in 
readings of 140mg% and 150mg%. 
British Columbia Provincial Court
The judge found the accused had not 
been detained until the officer smelled 
alcohol on his breath. “I do not believe 
that a reasonable person in [the 
accused’s] position would believe that his right to 
choose how to interact with [the officer] had been 
removed when he talked to [the officer]”, said the 
judge. “I find that [the accused] was not detained 
when he was seated in the back of the police 
vehicle, until after the officer smelled alcohol on 




8:07 p.m. Police dispatched to accident.
8:12 p.m. Officer arrives on scene of accident. Firefighters and paramedics already at scene.
8:14 p.m.
Officer detects slight smell of alcohol coming from 
accused’s breath. Accused told officer he had a beer at 
5:00 pm.
8:18 p.m. Officer made ASD demand. Accused failed ASD.
8:22 p.m.
Accused arrested for impaired driving causing bodily 
harm and advised of Charter rights. Breath demand also  
made.
Accused driven to police station.
8:56 p.m. Accused spoke to a lawyer at the police station.
9:10 p.m. At accused’s request, police called his girlfriend to let her know he had been in a collision and was alright.
9:24 p.m. 1st breath sample taken = 140mg%.
9:44 p.m. 2nd breath sample taken = 150mg%
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1. [The officer] did not tell [the accused] to come to 
her vehicle, she asked him to follow her to her 
vehicle, and to talk about what happened, and 
[the accused] followed her there.
2. While at the police vehicle [the officer] did not 
see any injuries on [the accused], but was 
concerned about his emotional state, and 
recognized that he may be in shock from the 
accident. She asked him if he was okay, and he 
said he was okay.
3. [The officer] told [the accused] he could sit in the 
back of the police vehicle, which he did. [The 
accused] sat sideways in the rear seat with his 
legs out of the vehicle and feet on the ground.  
This is some indication to me that [the accused] 
was not being restrained physically or mentally. 
The car door remained open throughout the 
conversation.
4. [The officer] stood in front of [the accused] as he 
was seated. She leaned in towards him when he 
told her what he had been doing that day leading 
up to the incident. [The officer] leaned in so that 
she could hear [the accused], with her face 
approximately one foot from [the accused’s] face.
5. [The officer] would have moved out of the way if 
[the accused] got out of the vehicle. [The officer] 
was not blocking [the accused’s] egress, nor was 
she crowding him, and that [the accused] could 
have got up and walked away without bumping 
into [the officer].
6. [The officer] ... believed she detained [the 
accused] once she read him the ASD demand.  
She accepted in cross-examination that she 
would probably have detained [the accused] if he 
tried to get up and leave after she smelled alcohol 
on his breath, but before she asked him if he had 
had anything to drink.
7. The duration of [the officer’s] interaction with [the 
accused] from the time she first approached him 
to the time she read the ASD demand was 
approximately five minutes. [The officer] ran 
checks on [the accused’s] identity at 8:14 p.m., 
just after they arrived to her vehicle.  She made 
the ASD demand at 8:18 p.m. The demand was 
made after [the accused] said he had one beer at 
5:00 p.m., which was after [the officer] had asked 
him if he had had alcohol to drink that day when 
she smelled liquor on his breath.
As for the ASD demand, the judge found it was 
valid. The officer testified she formed a suspicion 
for the  ASD demand on the following basis: (a) her 
belief the accident had occurred just prior to her 
being dispatched; (b) the odour of alcohol on the 
accused’s breath; (c) his admission to having had 
one beer; and (d) her belief he probably had more 
than one beer. Although the accused’s admission to 
consuming alcohol was lessened by the fact that it 
had been over three hours earlier, it was only one 
of the factors that contributed to an objectively 
reasonable suspicion that he had alcohol in his 
body. More significant than this admission, in the 
judge’s view, was the unexplained collision with a 
pedestrian on the side of the road. “There were 
skid marks consistent with very erratic driving,” 
said the judge. “They showed the vehicle had 
swerved across the  centre yellow lines of the  road, 
across the oncoming lane, and then off the road 
and through the gravel to land adjacent to the 
forested area facing the wrong direction.”
Although the smell of alcohol on the accused’s 
breath was slight, when combined with the 
unexplained accident and the admission to alcohol 
consumption, the judge was satisfied there were 
objectively reasonable grounds for the officer to 
suspect that the accused had alcohol in his body. 
Further, the officer believed the accused was the 
driver of the vehicle that struck the pedestrian 
based on his admission he was driving home. Thus, 
she had the requisite grounds to demand an ASD 
breath sample.
The judge also concluded that the accident 
occurred at or after 7:43 p.m., within the two-hour 
window of the taking of the first breath sample at 
9:24 p.m. so that the presumption of identity 
applied. The judge found that the  911 call was 
placed very shortly after the accident; an 
ambulance was dispatched at 8:03 p.m. and arrived 
on scene at 8:08 p.m.; and the ambulance  arrived 
22 to 25 minutes after the accident. The accused 
was convicted of causing an accident resulting in 
bodily harm while operating a motor vehicle with a 
blood alcohol level over 80mg%.  
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British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
trial judge erred in finding that 
he was not arbitrarily detained 
under s. 9 of the Charter 
before the ASD demand was made. In his view, he 
was detained as soon as the officer approached him 
to determine the cause of the accident and 
“placed” him in the back of her vehicle. He 
submitted that the officer was obligated to 
immediately advise him of his rights under ss. 10(a) 
and (b) when she approached him. Further, the 
accused suggested the trial judge erred in finding 
that the suspicion required to make an ASD 
demand existed.  Finally, the accused challenged 
the trial judge’s ruling that he  was driving within 
two hours of when the first breathalyzer sample 
was taken, and that the statutory “presumption of 
identity” applied despite the provisions repeal.
Detention
Justice Frankel, speaking for the Court of Appeal, 
found the trial judge did not err in holding that the 
accused was not detained before the officer 
demanded he provide an ASD sample. Citing R. v. 
Suberu, 2009 SCC 33, Justice Frankel noted that the 
Supreme Court of Canada “said that in the absence 
of physical restraint or a legal obligation to 
comply with a request to ‘wait’, the ‘analysis must 
consider whether the officer’s conduct in the 
context of the encounter as a whole would cause a 
reasonable person in the same situation to 
conclude that he or she was not free to go and that 
he or she  had to comply with the officer’s 
request.’”  Here, the trial judge properly assessed 
the circumstances and determined whether the line 
between general questioning and detention, which 
can be difficult to draw in a particular case, had 
been crossed. 
ASD Demand
A legally sound ASD demand has both a subjective 
and objective aspect. The demanding officer must 
subjectively have an honest suspicion that the 
detained driver has alcohol in his or her body and 
their suspicion must be based on objectively 
verifiable circumstances. In this case, the officer 
had the necessary  subjective suspicion as found by 
the trial judge.
As for the whether the officer’s suspicion was 
objectively reasonable, the Court of Appeal also 
upheld the trial judge’s ruling keeping in mind two 
important considerations. “The first is that 
‘reasonable suspicion deals with possibilities, 
rather than probabilities’,” Said Justice Frankel. 
“The second is that the officer who makes the 
demand does not have to believe  the driver is 
impaired or some other crime has been 
committed.” 
Although the officer did not state she considered 
the “unexplained” nature of the accident in 
deciding to make the ASD demand, it was obvious 
the accident was in her mind when she made the 
demand as reflected in her testimony. As well, there 
was an objective basis to suspect the accused had 
been driving in the preceding three hours as 
required by s. 254(2).  
The accused also contended that the ASD demand 
was made at 8:18 p.m. and there was no 
objectively reasonable possibility  the accident 
occurred at or after 5:18 p.m. Although there was 
no direct evidence as to the exact time of the 
accident, the 911 call was placed within minutes of 
the accident occurring. The officer received a 
dispatch at 8:07 p.m. and arrived on scene at 8:12 
p.m. Other first responders were already there. As 
well, the accident occurred on a busy highway 
during the summer tourist season and would have 
been obvious to anyone travelling that highway. “In 
light of this, it strains credulity to accept that [the 
officer’s] belief that the accident occurred just 
before  she arrived on the scene was not objectively 
reasonable,” said Justice Frankel. “To accede to 
[the accused’s] argument one would have to accept 
“[T]he officer who makes the [ASD] 
demand does not have to believe the 
driver is impaired or some other crime 
has been committed.”
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it took more than two and one-half hours after the 
9-1-1 call was placed for the police  to be 
dispatched.”  
Breathalyzer Demand
Under the former s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, 
the results of the breathalyzer tests were 
“conclusive  proof” of the blood alcohol level at the 
time of the offence provided that the first sample 
was taken not less than two hours after an alleged 
offence. This is known as the “presumption of 
identity”. Since the first sample was taken at 9:24 
p.m., the  Crown had to prove the accident 
occurred at or after 7:24 p.m.
“The [trial] judge’s assessment of the  reliability of 
the various aspects of the evidence and of the 
weight to be assigned to the  evidence were hers to 
make and are entitled to deference,” said Justice 
Frankel. “It cannot be said the judge’s findings are 
‘clearly wrong, unsupported by the evidence or 
otherwise unreasonable’.”  And the “presumption 
of identity” was not repealed when the new 
impaired driving regime came into force on 
December 2018. The presumption still applies to 
transitional cases (like this one that occurred in July 
2017). 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
EVIDENCE DESTRUCTION & 
SAFETY CONCERNS JUSTIFIED 
NO-KNOCK ENTRY
R. v. Pileggi, 2021 ONCA 4
After obtaining a tele-warrant to 
search the  accused’s home based on 
confidential sources, the police 
executed it at 1:43 p.m. The affiant 
knew the accused lived in his house 
with his wife and two young children. He had no 
criminal record. The affiant did not know of any 
firearms in the house. Without knocking, nine 
police officers forcibly entered the home. At least 
one, and maybe more, had their gun drawn. 
Immediately upon entering the house, some of the 
officers went upstairs. The accused, standing with 
his hands in the air, and his wife, holding a coffee 
cup, were found in the master bedroom. 
The accused was ordered to kneel on the floor. He 
was then handcuffed behind his back and advised 
he was under arrest for possessing oxycodone for 
the purpose of trafficking. His wife was not 
handcuffed and was allowed to sit on the bed. Two 
EVENT GRID
Time Event 
1:35 a.m. Search warrant issued. It could be executed between 2:00 a.m. and 8:59 p.m.
1:06 p.m. Search warrant execution briefing conducted. 
1:43 p.m. Search Warrant executed. No-knock entry utilized. Accused arrested.
1:50 p.m.
Accused read his s. 10(b) Charter rights. Police told 
accused they would call his father with a view to 
contacting a lawyer. The accused was offered access to 
duty counsel in the meantime. 
2:00 p.m. 
Search conducted. Police subsequently found one 
kilogram of cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and $3,695 
CAD.
2:08 p.m. Accused transported to police station.
2:37 p.m. Accused brought into booking area.
2:39 p.m. Police called duty counsel.
3:01 p.m.
Duty counsel called back and the accused’s wife spoke 
to duty counsel. Duty counsel told police he would not 
be able to speak to the accused and asked police to call 
back in an hour when another lawyer would be 
available.
3:05 p.m. Police called duty counsel back and left a message.
3:42 p.m. Police told the accused duty counsel had not yet called back.
Unknown
The accused asked to speak with a specific lawyer. A 
call was made but the lawyer’s colleague said the lawyer 
was not available. 
4:50 p.m. Entire search completed.
4:55 p.m. Police discovered accused had still not yet spoken to a lawyer.
5:00 p.m. Accused agreed to speak to duty counsel. Duty counsel called and a message was left.
5:15 p.m. Accused spoke to duty counsel for 10 minutes.
9:32 p.m. Accused offered duty counsel again after being re-arrested for additional offence.
Additional times taken from R. v. Pileggi, 2019 ONSC 2097
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officers remained in the bedroom while  other 
officers “cleared” the house, taking about seven 
minutes to do so. At that point, the accused was 
advised of his right to counsel. He said that he 
wished to contact his father with a view to 
speaking with a lawyer. The officer told the accused 
that police could call his father to ascertain the 
name of a lawyer and he was offered duty counsel 
in the meantime. The accused then spontaneously 
said that whatever the  police found belonged to 
him, and not his wife. 
The arresting officer’s handcuffs were swapped out 
with the transporting officer’s handcuffs. The 
accused was patted down and a bottle  containing 
five oxycodone pills was found in his pocket. While 
being taken downstairs for transport, the accused 
was read the search warrant. He said that his wife 
had nothing to do with it. He was asked whether he 
wanted to tell police where anything was, but 
replied “no”. He and his wife  were then separately 
transported to the police  station. His wife spoke to 
duty  counsel at about 3:00 p.m. while the accused 
spoke to a lawyer at 5:15 p.m. During the search of 
the house, the police found a large quantity of 
oxycodone pills, a kilogram of cocaine, drug 
paraphernalia, and $3,695 in cash. The accused 
was charged with possessing cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking and possessing property 
obtained by crime.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The affiant testified that it was always 
part of the plan to use  a battering ram to 
break down the  door because drugs can 
easily be flushed down the toilet. He 
said about 90% of the drug warrants he had 
executed involved forced entry but disagreed that 
police had a blanket policy of effecting a forced 
entry  whenever a  search warrant for drugs was 
executed. The lead officer in the execution of the 
warrant testified police  forcibly entered the home 
because  they were concerned about the loss of 
evidence. He disagreed that he had a blanket 
policy  of using forced entry in searches involving 
any drug. The officer who breached the  front door 
also testified. He said, “there’s no hard and fast 
rule [on] how we do a warrant entry”. But he was 
unaware of the knock and announce rule. 
The judge found that the manner in which the 
police executed the search warrant did not violate 
the accused’s s. 8 Charter rights. The judge relied 
upon the police evidence that drugs in pill form 
could be easily flushed down a toilet, especially in 
a two-story house where there are readily 
accessible washrooms on both floors. And since 
police had no idea where in the home the  accused 
might be, he would have quick and ready access to 
a washroom if entry were to be announced. The 
judge also accepted police evidence about how 
weapons are often present at places where they 
execute search warrants. Just because there may be 
no information indicating that weapons may be 
located in the place to be searched, it did not 
necessarily mean that weapons will not be present. 
The decision to handcuff the accused did not 
violate his right against arbitrary detention under s. 
9. The judge concluded that the police acted 
reasonably in handcuffing the accused, both in his 
home and en route to the police station. The use of 
handcuffs was appropriate during the safety check 
of the  house and during transport to the police 
station. 
Finally, the judge held the police did not violate the 
accused’s right to counsel under s. 10(b) in any 
way. The seven minute delay in providing s. 10(b) 
rights was reasonable  while the police were 
searching and securing the home. And when the 
officer posed the question about whether the 
accused wanted to tell the police where anything 
was, it was in response to a spontaneous statement 
made by him, which itself was not prompted by a 
question. Access to counsel was not provided at the 
house because private consultation could not be 
afforded. Finally, the judge held that the police  did 
not intentionally delay the accused’s right of access 
to counsel. The accused effectively waived his right 
to speak to counsel of choice by agreeing to speak 
with different counsel. Moreover, had she found 
any Charter  breaches, the judge would not have 
excluded any of the evidence under s. 24(2). The 
accused was convicted of a possessing cocaine for 
the purpose of trafficking.
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Ontario Court of Appeal 
The accused alleged that his 
rights under s. 8 (unreasonable 
s e a rch ) , s . 9 ( a r b i t r a r y 
detention) and s. 10(b) (right to 
counsel) of the Charter had all been breached. 
Unreasonable Search - No Knock Entry
The accused argued the manner in which the 
police carried out the search of his home infringed 
s. 8 of the  Charter because they employed a forced 
entry, which was more  force than was reasonably 
necessary. In his view, the police were acting under 
a blanket policy not to knock and announce when 
executing drug warrants.
In analyzing the reasonableness of the police entry 
in this case, Justice Trotter, delivering the Court of 
Appeal’s decision, stated:
The police must exercise restraint when 
executing search warrants. This is rooted in 
statute, the common law, and Charter 
jurisprudence.
Section 12(b) of the CDSA authorizes the 
police to “use as much force as is necessary in 
the circumstances” when executing a search 
warrant issued under s. 11. Of more general 
application, s. 25(1) of the Criminal Code, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 uses the same language.
Police officers executing search warrants must 
“knock and announce” their presence at the 
place to be searched. ... [I]in the ordinary case, 
the police should give: “(i) notice of presence 
by knocking or ringing the doorbell, (ii) notice 
of authority, by identifying themselves as law 
enforcement officers and (iii) notice of purpose, 
by stating a lawful reason for entry”.
However, these well-established criteria are not 
absolute. Public safety (including the safety of 
police officers), as well as preventing the 
destruction of evidence, may relieve the police 
of the “knock and announce” requirement. 
[references omitted, paras. 20-23]
In deciding to depart from and dispense with the 
knocking and announcing, the following 
requirements must be met:
• Where the police depart from the knock and 
announce rule, they must explain why they 
thought it was necessary to do so.
• The Crown must lay an evidentiary foundation 
that the police had reasonable grounds to be 
concerned about the possibility of harm to 
themselves or the occupants, or about the 
destruction of evidence.
• The greater the departure by the police from the 
knock and announce rule, the heavier the onus to 
justify what they did.
• The evidence to justify such behaviour must be 
apparent in the record and available to the police 
at the time they acted. In other words, ex post 
facto justifications will not suffice. [para. 27]
“In applying these factors, courts must be alive to 
the realities of policing,” said Justice Trotter. “The 
police  are afforded a certain amount of latitude 
when they decide to enter residential premises, 
based on information that is reasonably available 
to them.”
The Court of Appeal adopted the trial judge’s 
analysis on the destruct ion of evidence 
justification. “The police had reasonable grounds 
to conclude that an unannounced and forced entry 
was required to prevent the destruction of 
evidence,”  said Justice Trotter. “Given the size and 
layout of the house, as well as the nature of the 
drugs in question, there was a real likelihood that 
“Public safety (including the safety of police officers), as well as preventing the 
destruction of evidence, may relieve the police of the ‘knock and announce’ 
requirement.”
“The police are afforded a certain amount of latitude when they decide to enter 
residential premises, based on information that is reasonably available to them.”
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the  [accused] would be able to destroy the 
evidence quickly and with ease.”
The Court of Appeal also agreed with the trial judge 
that safety concerns justified a forced entry without 
knocking and announcing rule. Police evidence 
showed that weapons are often discovered in 
residences when executing drug warrants. 
“Although there was no information available to 
the officers suggesting that there were firearms 
located at the [accused’s] residence, the 
allegations involved serious drug charges,” said 
Justice Trotter. “The all too typical toxic 
combination of drugs and guns is well known to 
the police and the courts. Police must be entitled 
to some degree to rely upon their collective 
experience when approaching situations that may 
endanger their lives.” 
Rather than the police simply  acting under a 
blanket policy to conduct forced entries when 
executing  search warrants for drugs, they  made an 
independent assessment of the circumstances they 
faced:
The fact that the police act in the same way in 
the vast majority of cases presenting similar 
circumstances does not equate with the 
existence of a blanket policy. There is no 
impropriety in the police drawing on their 
collective experience when performing the 
same investigative task, so long as they remain 
open to performing their duties differently 
should circumstances permit.
In this case, there was evidence that the officers 
made an individualized assessment about the 
appropriate manner of search. At the briefing 
before executing the search warrant, they 
decided to use a battering ram due to concerns 
about the potential loss of evidence. ... [T]hese 
concerns were pronounced because of 
contextual considerations: the nature of the 
drugs (oxycodone pills that could be flushed) 
and the layout of the house (two levels with the 
potential for multiple washrooms). [paras. 
36-37]
The trial judge’s conclusion that the officers’ 
departure from the “knock and announce” standard 
was justified was amply supported by the evidence.
Arbitrary Detention - Handcuffing
The accused submitted that his handcuffing without 
justification, both in his home and en route to the 
police station, rendered his detention arbitrary. In 
his view, he presented no safety concerns. 
Although the execution of a search warrant does 
not automatically entitle the police to handcuff 
those located in the place to be searched, it was 
not unreasonable to handcuff the accused in his 
home and in the police car:
... All of the evidence points to the unknown 
variables the police face when they enter a 
home to execute a search warrant, particularly 
as it relates to the presence of others in the 
place to be searched (an aspect of [the arresting 
officer’s] testimony that I return to below). In 
this case, the evidence supports the conclusion 
that the situation was not safe, or completely 
under control, until the house was cleared.
The police were also justified in using 
handcuffs once they cleared the house. I 
disagree with the [accused’s] submission that 
his compliance to that point required the 
removal of the handcuffs. There was no 
guarantee that he would continue to cooperate 
with the police.
The [accused] submits that, because the police 
did not conduct a pat-down search on him 
before handcuffing him, they did not 
reasonably believe that he posed any safety 
concerns. I do not find this argument 
persuasive. ... [H]ad the police conducted a 
pat-down search and found nothing, this would 
not necessarily have precluded them from 
lawfully placing the [accused] in handcuffs. As 
it turned out, the pre-transport search of the 
[accused] revealed a bottle of oxycodone in his 
front pocket.
It is important to note that the police did not 
handcuff the [accused] solely for the purpose of 
facilitating the safe execution of the search 
warrant; he had also been placed under arrest 
for a serious criminal offence. ... [A]n arrest is a 
“continuing act” that involves taking the person 
into custody and “by action or words 
restraining him from moving anywhere beyond 
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the arrester’s control”, which continues until a 
detainee is either released or remanded into 
custody .... This factor contributed to the 
reasonableness of the decision to handcuff the 
[accused], both at his home and during 
transport. During that time, the [accused] was 
an arrestee and the police were entitled to 
restrain him from moving anywhere beyond 
their control, both for his own safety and the 
safety of the officers. [references omitted, paras. 
48-51]
And just because the police allowed the accused’s 
wife to sit on the bed, without handcuffs, did not 
render the police conduct in handcuffing  him 
arbitrary. “In my view, it suggests the opposite,” 
said Justice Trotter. “The police  chose to handcuff 
the person at the centre of their investigation. That 
was the [accused]; not his wife. Again, the lack of 
evidence on this point undermines the [accused’s] 
contention.” Nor did the swapping of the handcuffs 
suggest they were unnecessary in the first place, or 
that the officers should have reassessed the 
situation. The exchange of handcuffs had nothing to 
do with the accused’s perceived risk. 
Right to Counsel           
The accused contended his s. 10(b) right to counsel 
had been violated in four ways:
1. the police failed to fulfill their informational 
duties by not advising him of his s. 10(b) rights 
while the house was being cleared;
2. his rights were  breached by the delay in the 
implementational component by not allowing 
him to contact counsel from his home;
3. his rights were breached when he was 
questioned before he could consult counsel; 
and
4. the police failed to facilitate his counsel of 
choice.
Right to Counsel - Informational Delay    
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s finding 
that the police  did not infringe s. 10(b) by their brief 
seven minute delay in advising him of the 
informational component of the right to counsel 
after arrest. The arresting officer testified it was not 
safe to advise the accused of his right to counsel 
because  the bedroom had not been cleared and 
police had no idea whether there were any other 
people in the house. “Public and officer safety may 
i m p a c t b o t h t h e i n f o r m a t i o n a l a n d 
implementational obligations in s. 10(b),” said 
Justice Trotter. “On the facts of this case, concerns 
for officer safety justified a  brief delay in 
delivering the informational component of s. 
10(b). Once the officers secured the premises, 
they immediately  turned their minds to the 
[accused]. The delay was a mere  seven minutes. 
This was reasonable in the circumstances.”
Right to Counsel - Duty to Hold Off
When the officer asked the accused whether he 
wanted to tell police where  anything was, the 
officer failed in his duty to hold off questioning 
s. 10 Everyone has the right on arrest or detention
a. to be informed promptly of the reasons 
therefor;
b. to retain and instruct counsel without delay 
and to be informed of that right; ...
Charter of Rights
Volume 21 Issue 1 ~ January/February 2021
PAGE 25
until the accused had consulted counsel. Justice 
Trotter stated:
... It is true that the [accused] made a 
spontaneous statement, one that was indirectly 
incriminating. The statement revealed 
knowledge of illegal items in his home, if not 
control over those items. Since the [accused] 
had just been told that he was under arrest for 
possession of oxycodone for the purpose of 
trafficking, one could infer that he was referring 
to drugs.
It is debatable whether [the officer’s] question 
was in “direct response” to the [accused’s] 
utterance. It certainly came immediately after 
the [accused’s] assertion. But the [accused’s] 
assertion did not call for a “response”. It did not 
entitle the officer to seek further incriminating 
evidence from the [accused].
Once a detainee has been informed of his 
rights under s. 10(b) of the Charter, and that 
person indicates that they wish to retain 
counsel, the police have a “duty to hold off 
questioning or otherwise attempting to elicit 
evidence from the detainee. This duty also 
prevents the police from interacting with an 
accused person, short of questioning, in a 
manner that that triggers a response from the 
accused – i.e., something that is a “functional 
equivalent” of an interrogation.
I need not decide whether reading the contents 
of the search warrant to the [accused] was an 
attempt to elicit evidence. Suffice it to say, [the 
officer] entered dangerous territory in doing so. 
The law does not require the police to explain 
the contents of a warrant to occupants when a 
search warrant is executed. Rather, the police 
must have the warrant with them “where it is 
feasible to do so, and … produce it when 
requested to do so”: Criminal Code, s. 29(1). 
However, by asking the [accused] if he would 
like to tell police where anything was, [the 
officer] was seeking incriminating evidence. At 
the time, he did not even know whether the 
[accused] had been advised of his right to 
counsel. He should have asked the officer who 
accompanied the [accused] downstairs. This 
situation called for caution, not hubris. 
[references omitted, paras. 69-72]
Even though the accused declined to answer the 
question and it was unsuccessful in eliciting any 
evidence, “the breach arose because the officer 
attempted to elicit  incriminating information in 
the first place”, said Justice Trotter. “In other 
words, it was the purpose of his question, and not 
the response, that violated the duty to hold off. 
The fact that the question did not yield any 
inculpatory evidence does not neutralize the 
Charter breach.”
Right to Counsel - Facilitation On Scene
There was no s. 10(b) breach when the police failed 
to afford the accused the  opportunity to consult 
counsel while he was still in his house and before 
being transported to the police station. A police 
officer testified that, in his experience, he always 
waited to facilitate access to counsel until the 
accused person was transported to the police 
stat ion “where they can have a  private 
conversation, where we can maintain custody of 
them.”  Providing a private conversation at the 
house would not have been feasible. The house was 
being searched and the accused was handcuffed. 
“In these circumstances, it is difficult to fathom 
how the police could have accommodated a 
private conversation at the [accused’s] home,” said 
Justice Trotter. “Consultation in private is a vital 
component of the s. 10(b) right. The [accused’s] 
right to consult counsel in private  would have been 
compromised by attempting to facilitate contact at 
the house while a search was underway.”
“Once a detainee has been informed of his rights under s. 10(b) of the Charter, and 
that person indicates that they wish to retain counsel, the police have a ‘duty to 
hold off questioning or otherwise attempting to elicit evidence from the detainee. 
This duty also prevents the police from interacting with an accused person, short 
of questioning, in a manner that that triggers a response from the accused – i.e., 
something that is a “functional equivalent” of an interrogation.”
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Right to Counsel - Implementational 
Duty/Counsel of Choice
The police failed in their implementational duties 
by the lengthy delay  in facilitating the accused’s 
contact with counsel and by failing to arrange 
contact with his counsel of choice. At 1:50 p.m. the 
accused was offered access to duty counsel before 
being transported to the police station. Then, at 
4:55 p.m. it was discovered that he had still not 
spoken to a lawyer. He accepted an offer to speak 
to duty counsel and had a private  conversation with 
a lawyer at 5:15 p.m. 
The officer who agreed to speak with the accused’s 
father and facilitate  contact with a  private lawyer 
did not contact the  father. Instead, he assumed that 
the transporting officer would follow through and 
make the inquiry. “The failure to follow through on 
the undertaking to contact the [accused’s] father 
about a  lawyer, combined with the overall delay in 
facilitating contact with any lawyer, infringed s. 
10(b) of the Charter,” said Justice Trotter. “The 
police  had undertaken the role  of ascertaining the 
name of a lawyer from the [accused’s] father. They 
failed to do so. ... The [accused] reasonably relied 
on the undertaking of the police to facilitate his 
access to a private  lawyer, and when this did not 
happen, he agreed to duty counsel. Through no 
lack of diligence on his part, this did not happen 
until 5:15 p.m., more than three  hours after his 
arrest.”
s. 24(2) - Exclusion of Evidence
Despite the two s. 10(b) Charter breaches, which 
were temporally and contextually connected with 
the discovery of the drugs at his residence, the 
Court of Appeal would not have excluded the 
evidence under s. 24(2). 
The breach of the duty to hold off by asking the 
question at the home was “fleeting and 
inconsequential”; no further evidence was 
obtained as a result of the question. The breach 
involving the failure  to properly implement the 
accused’s right to counsel was more serious, but 
unintentional. These breaches, in combination, 
favoured exclusion. However, the impact of the 
breaches on the accused’s Charter-protected 
interests did not favour exclusion. The failure to 
hold off had minimal impact, while the impact of 
the the three-hour delay and denial of counsel of 
choice was not significant. Finally, the evidence 
was reliable and its admission would enhance the 
truth-seeking function of the trial. The admission of 
the evidence discovered during the search would 
not bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute. The evidence was admissible.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
VIDEO OF ARRESTEE USING 
TOILET UNREASONABLE: STAY 
APPROPRIATE
R. v. Paterson, 2021 SKCA 13
A police officer arrested the accused 
for impaired care or control after 
finding her slumped over in the 
driver’s seat of a car. She had trouble 
focusing and smelled of alcohol. 
When she was out of the vehicle, the accused had 
difficulty walking. She was transported to the police 
station and placed in a cell, which was monitored 
by a closed circuit television video (CCTV) camera.  
The CCTV captured nearly all of the  cell area, 
including the toilet area, and could be viewed on a 
monitor in the booking area of the station. Police 
officers and other detention staff who might be in 
the area could view the monitor. No particular 
member of the  detention staff had the job of 
actively monitoring the screens displaying the 
video, but the staff present did have a general 
obligation to monitor the screens at all times and 
had the ability to do so. The video was in colour 
and equipped with sound, which assisted the 
detention staff in identifying whether a detainee 
was yelling or in distress.
While in the cell, the accused indicated that she 
needed to go to the  bathroom. She was unable to 
do so by herself and was assisted by the two female 
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officers who had arrested her. She fell down twice 
when she first attempted to use the toilet. 
Eventually, the officers had to physically support 
her as she got on and off the toilet. No steps were 
taken by the officers to shield the accused from the 
camera in her cell. And the  accused made no 
attempt to cover herself when she was standing or 
when she was reaching for toilet paper. When she 
rose with the assistance of the  officers, the 
accused’s pants were lowered to above her knees 
and she was captured on video naked from about 
her navel to about her knees for a couple of 
seconds. 
The accused was charged with having the care or 
control of a motor vehicle when her ability
to operate it was impaired. 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The judge found the accused’s arrest 
proper, and the presence and assistance 
of the police officers in the cell while 
she used the washroom appropriate. But 
the video recording of her going to the toilet was a 
s. 8 Charter breach. Capturing the accused on 
video using the toilet amounted to a seizure. 
Although there was a need for some surveillance of 
persons in custody, the accused still had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, although 
reduced, when using the cell toilet. 
The judge concluded that no thought had been 
given to the accused’s bathroom activity  being 
video recorded. The judge assumed this was routine 
practice for the treatment of detained individuals in 
police cells. It was not an isolated event. In the 
judge’s view, police forces in Saskatchewan had 
notice that video recording an accused’s toilet 
activities breached s. 8 because of an earlier court 
decision (R. v. Wildfong, 2015 SKPC 55). 
The video recording was a serious invasion of the 
accused’s privacy and personal integrity. The 
impaired driving charge was stayed under s. 24(1) 
of the Charter  “to ensure the state misconduct in 
videotaping persons using toilets while in 
detention does not continue.” 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
The Crown appealed the trial judge’s 
decision arguing that it was an error to 
find a s. 8 violation. The Crown 
submitted that there is a low expectation 
of privacy for a person being detained and the 
in t ru s ion was no t un reasonab le in the 
circumstances. 
The appeal judge upheld the trial judge’s analysis 
and conclusion that there was a s. 8 breach:
... [U]sing a toilet is a deeply private activity, 
and although it would be unreasonable for a 
detainee to expect no video surveillance while 
in custody, it is not unreasonable for the 
[accused] to expect privacy while using the 
toilet. Additionally, ... [the accused] was using 
the toilet while sitting down and her genitals 
were fully exposed to the camera. Courts have 
established that respecting the privacy of 
detainees using the toilet can easily be 
accomplished either through technological 
fixes or by providing privacy shrouds to 
detainees. Female officers were physically 
present when [the accused] used the toilet for 
the purpose of assisting her, but there was no 
evidence that the officers gave any thought to 
the protection of the [accused’s] privacy while 
she used the toilet despite knowing that the 
area was under video surveillance. No covering 
was provided to [the accused] and the camera 
was not temporarily disabled. This evidence is 
reasonably capable of upholding [the trial 
judge’s] finding that the [accused’]s s. 8 rights 
were breached. [R. v. Paterson, 2019 SKQB 
305, at para. 25]
However, the appeal judge ruled a stay of 
proceedings was not an appropriate remedy. In his 
view, the trial judge mistakenly presumed that the 
thoughtlessness regarding privacy rights was 
“routine practice for the treatment of detained 
individuals … [and] not an isolated incident”. But 
there was no evidence to support that the 
surveillance of detainees using the toilet without 
privacy protection was systemic. The trial judge’s 
decision to enter a stay was for a  “punitive 
purpose”. The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the 
stay of proceedings was vacated and a  conviction 
was entered.
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Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused appealed the 
vaca t i ng o f t he s t ay  o f 
proceedings arguing, in part, 
that the trial judge correctly 
found the Wildfong decision ought to have been 
known to the police service so as to cause it to 
address i ts video survei l lance pract ices. 
Furthermore, the accused contended the stay of 
proceedings was appropriate. 
Unreasonable Search
The Crown first suggested that the lower courts 
incorrectly found that the accused had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy such that her s. 8 
Charter rights had been violated. But Justice 
Ottenbreit, authoring the Court of Appeal’s opinion, 
rejected the Crown’s submission. He found “the 
analysis conducted by the appeal judge on this 
issue [was] compelling and his conclusion [was] 
correct.” 
Police Should Have Known About 
Charter Breach 
The accused contended that, at the time she was 
detained, almost four years had passed since the 
Wildfong decision had been issued. By that time, it 
should have been apparent to the police service 
that its practice of surveilling detainees using the 
toilet was a  Charter  violation. The Crown, on the 
other hand, suggested that the Wildfong  decision 
was limited because it was a single Provincial 
Court decision from a different part of the province 
directed at a different police service. 
Justice Ottenbreit opined that the Wildfong case 
“should have alerted the [police service] to the 
issue of surveilling detainees going to the 
bathroom.” And there was no evidence that the 
police service had made any effort to address the 
issue of privacy raised in the Wildfong  case. Justice 
Ottenbreit stated:
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the 
trial judge concluded that the failure of police 
forces in Saskatchewan to change their 
practices following Wildfong and the several 
decisions dealing with the same issue in 
Ontario reflected a lack of diligence. This was a 
reasonable inference considering four years 
h a d p a s s e d s i n c e Wi l d f o n g . I n t h e 
circumstances, she appropriately noted that 
once the issue was raised, it should have been 
apparent to the persons responsible for police 
policies that changes needed to be made and 
that video recording persons using the 
washroom could constitute a serious invasion 
of their privacy and personal integrity.
The appeal judge was wrong to draw the 
distinction that Wildfong was decided in 
Saskatoon and not Regina and involved another 
police force. Such distinctions are neither here 
nor there. Decisions of the trial courts have the 
same significance throughout the province. Nor 
is the fact identified by the appeal judge that 
this Court had not ruled on the privacy issue 
involved determinative. The absence of a ruling 
by this Court on any issue does not necessarily 
mean that police forces need not address 
legitimate issues identified by the trial courts. 
The question of whether they must do so 
depends on the circumstances including, but 
not limited to: the nature of the issue that has 
been decided; the level and number of courts 
that have addressed the issue; whether the issue 
has been fully argued; the extent to which the 
law could reasonably be characterized as 
unsettled; and the nature, cost and ability to 
carry out remedial action that would respond to 
the court’s decision. [paras. 48-49]
Stay of Proceedings
The Court of Appeal concluded that the  trial judge 
did not err in entering a stay of proceedings. She 
did not enter a stay for a  “punitive purpose”, but 
considered a number of factors in determining that 
a stay was necessary. The Wildfong decision was 
only  one consideration among others, including the 
nature of the charge and other court decisions. She 
issued the stay not to punish the police, but for a 
“prospective”  reason - to ensure that police 
misconduct in video recording persons using the 
toilet while in detention did not continue.
Moreover, the trial judge properly inferred that the 
surveillance of detainees using the toilet was 
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systemic or that no thought was given by the  police 
service to a detainee’s privacy rights:
[The evidence before the trial judge] was that 
the video monitoring system had been in place 
for eight to ten years, that every cell had a 
camera and that each camera recorded the 
entire cell in which it was placed and was 
recording at all times. The evidence was that 
the video from the cameras was fed to 
monitors. All of that looks very much like a 
system of continuous surveillance. Additionally, 
the trial judge had evidence that the officers 
helping [the accused] were aware of the video 
surveillance when [the accused] was using the 
toilet but that they made no effort to take extra 
measures to protect her privacy when doing so.
... [T]he Crown failed to call any evidence 
about the nature and extent of the video 
monitoring that was taking place when [the 
accused] was placed into the cell or the length 
of time it had been in existence. There was also 
no evidence regarding what steps, if any, 
officers were instructed to take to afford 
detainees some privacy when using the toilet 
and what [the police service] policies regarding 
the issue were in place. On this latter point, all 
the trial judge had to consider was the 
behaviour of the police officers while assisting 
[the accused].
In the absence of any such evidence before her 
that could address the foregoing issues, the trial 
judge was entitled to reasonably infer there had 
been a video system in place for a long time 
that captured detainees going to the toilet and, 
that being the case, the behaviour of the officer 
in not providing extra privacy to [the accused] 
was routine. ...[paras. 58]
Justice Ottenbreit “found that it was correct to 
conclude in all the  circumstances that, based on 
the evidence before  the trial judge, the [police 
service] had failed to recognize the issues in 
Wildfong and done nothing about it in four years.” 
The trial judge made no error in imposing a stay of 
proceedings.  
The accused’s appeal was allowed and the stay of 
proceedings reinstated.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
POTENTIAL INNOCENT 
EXPLANATION DOES NOT 
PRECLUDE RGB FINDING 
R. v. Tran, 2021 ABCA 58
 
The police received information from 
a confidential informer that the 
accused was using his Toyota Tundra 
to traffic cocaine. The accused had a 
criminal record and the  police 
started an investigation, which included six days 
of  surveillance. The affiant, a nine year member 
assigned to the Drug and Gang Enforcement Unit, 
believed the accused was involved in eight separate 
transactions. The affiant prepared an Information to 
Obtain (ITO) and a  search warrant was issued to 
search two dwellings (the  accused’s home and a 
condo believed to be his stash pad) and his Toyota 
Tundra. The following day, the police arrested the 
accused. He was told he would not be permitted to 
contact a lawyer until the searches of the two 
dwellings was complete. 
When the warrant was executed, 
police uncovered mult iple 
k i l og rams o f d rug s , d rug 
trafficking paraphernalia, cell 
phones, body armour, and 
$60,000 at the  properties. The 
drugs seized included over 3.5 
kilograms of methamphetamine, 
5 kilograms of cocaine, 398.4 
grams of heroin, and 137 kilograms of phenacetin, 
a drug used to convert soft cocaine to crack 
cocaine. Inside the Tundra,  police  located a 
sophisticated electronically operated hidden 
compartment.
The accused spoke to counsel one hour and 12 
minutes after his arrest. This was also 23 minutes 
after he arrived at the police station, 13 minutes of 
which involved waiting to be  placed in the phone 
room following a secondary frisk search. The 
accused was subsequently charged with 10 
offences under the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act, the Criminal Code and the Body 
Armour Control Act.
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Alberta Provincial Court
The accused argued that the  ITO did not 
justify a search warrant for the 
residential properties nor his vehicle (s. 
8 Charter). He also submitted that 
reasonable grounds did not exist for his arrest (s. 9 
Charter) and that, upon his arrest, he was subjected 
to unreasonable delay in accessing counsel (s. 
10(b) Charter).
The judge rejected the accused’s assertions. First, 
there  were sufficient grounds to justify the warrant. 
Although the informer’s description of criminal 
activity was “bare bones” – the accused dealt in 
cocaine and used a dark coloured Toyota Tundra  to 
supply  it – the police conducted independent 
investigation, including:
• The accused listed the house (registered in his 
parents’ names) as his mailing address and had 
paid utilities for the property since 2006;
• The accused was the sole shareholder and 
director of a  numbered company that owned 
the Toyota Tundra;
• The accused had the following criminal record: 
➡ 2003 – possession of a controlled substance (s 
4(1) CDSA),  and
➡ 2010 – possession of loaded, prohibited or 
restricted firearm (s 95 CC) and possession of 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking (s 5(2) 
of  CDSA).  He was sentenced to six years’ 
imprisonment and released on full parole in 
June 2013. He had also been charged with 
possessing cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking in 2008 but that charge was 
dropped as part of a negotiated plea.
The judge also found the six days of surveillance 
led the affiant to believe that the accused engaged 
in eight separate drug transactions and used the 
condo as a “stash pad.” All but one of these 
transactions led the  judge to conclude, when 
viewed in totality and through the lens of the 
affiant’s training and experience, that it was 
objectively reasonable to believe drug transactions 
had occurred.
As for the arrest, it too was lawful. The arresting 
officer relied on the contents of the ITO, plus his 
knowledge of a later occurring  transaction. The 
arresting officer’s subjective belief of reasonable 
grounds to arrest was objectively reasonable.
The accused was convicted of possessing cocaine, 
methamphetamine, and heroin for the purposes of 
trafficking, producing cocaine, possessing 
ammunition while prohibited, and possessing body 
armour while banned. He was sentenced to nine 
years’ imprisonment, less 48 days’ credit.
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused maintained that 
his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9 
and 10(b) had been breached 
and the trial judge had erred in 
holding otherwise. He again challenged the 
sufficiency of the ITO, the  lawfulness of his arrest 
and the delay in providing him access to counsel. 
The Search - ITO 
The Court of Appeal summarized the applicable 
test for a Charter compliant search as follows:
… [W]hether reasonable grounds existed, 
established upon oath, to believe  that an 
offence has been committed and that there is 
evidence to be found at the place of a 
proposed search. While credible and reliable 
evidence must support more than mere 
suspicion that evidence will be found, it is not 
necessary to prove on a balance of probabilities 
that evidence will in fact be found through the 
proposed searches. [para. 19]
“While credible and reliable evidence must support more than mere suspicion that 
evidence will be found, it is not necessary to prove on a balance of probabilities 
that evidence will in fact be found through the proposed searches.”
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The accused argued two reasons why the ITO was 
insufficient. First, he suggested the trial judge failed 
to give any consideration to the evidence in the 
ITO that he operated reputable siding and nail/spa 
businesses and that the encounters thought to be 
drug transactions could have been legitimate 
business dealings. Since no drugs were actually 
observed during the transactions, they were 
equivocal and open to innocent explanation. 
Second, he submitted that the trial judge erred in 
failing to recognize a lack of evidence regarding 
the affiant’s training, experience or expertise that 
could support the opinions proffered in the ITO. 
Innocent Explanation
The Court of Appeal disagreed with the  accused 
that, because the  surveillance evidence was 
equivocal and open to innocent explanation, the 
totality  of the circumstances rose only to mere 
suspicion of criminal activity. The trial judge was 
aware no hand to hand drug transactions were 
observed, and she considered and rejected the 
alternative explanation of legitimate business 
activities:
Even if this Court lowered its collective 
eyebrow and assumed, for the sake of 
discussion, that the transactions observed to 
have taken place in the front seat of [the 
accused’s] vehicle were legitimate business 
dealings, the fact remains that it is not enough 
to simply articulate an alternative innocent 
explanation. As the trial judge correctly pointed 
out, the presence of potential innocent 
explanations for the observed conduct does not 
preclude an officer from having reasonable 
grounds to believe the observed transactions 
were criminal in nature. … 
Mere identification of a possible innocent 
explanation to set aside a warrant would set a 
standard much higher than reasonable grounds. 
Further, even if a single item of evidence might 
be conducive to an innocent explanation, or be 
otherwise deficient, this will not impugn the 
decision to issue the warrant. As this Court has 
repeatedly stated, the information in the ITO 
must be read in its entirety and in context. … 
It is worth repeating. The “overall picture” in 
this instance is not whether a prima facie case 
had been made out against [the accused] nor is 
it his ultimate guilt or innocence. The question 
is simply whether reasonable grounds 
existed  to believe  that evidence would be 
located. Those grounds existed here. 
  
[The affiant] deposed that the information from 
the CI was corroborated. [The accused] was 
observed multiple times in what was believed 
to be drug transactions. He was seen leaving 
his residence in his Tundra vehicle, conducting 
activity thought to be drug transactions and 
later returning to his residence. He was 
observed accessing a “stash pad” that he did 
not own. Of the three occasions he attended at 
this location, he was once seen leaving with a 
duffle bag. Another time, he left with a “lumpy 
and heavily-weighted” bag. He was further 
observed engaging in “heat check” driving, to 
determine if he was being followed. The totality 
of this information, together with [the 
accused’s] related criminal record and prior use 
of a “stash pad”, all supported [the affiant’s] 
objectively reasonable belief, that in turn 
justified the issuance of the warrant. [references 
omitted, paras. 24-27]
“Mere identification of a possible innocent explanation to set aside a warrant 
would set a standard much higher than reasonable grounds. Further, even if a 
single item of evidence might be conducive to an innocent explanation, or be 
otherwise deficient, this will not impugn the decision to issue the warrant.”
“The ‘overall picture’ in this instance is not whether a prima facie case had been 
made out against [the accused] nor is it his ultimate guilt or innocence. The 
question is simply whether reasonable grounds existed to believe that evidence 
would be located.” 
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Inadequate Training & Experience
The accused argued that there was a lack of 
detailed evidence in the ITO regarding the affiant’s 
training, experience, and expertise to support the 
opinions he proffered. The ITO, he  suggested, only 
outlined in a general sense the affiant’s experience 
without offering any details of his involvement with 
the Drug and Gang Enforcement Unit. “We reject 
the suggestion that an affiant to an ITO must 
provide a detailed  curriculum vitae  of his or her 
expertise akin to an expert statement of 
qualification,” said the Court of Appeal. “This 
degree of detail is unnecessary and, in any event, 
[the accused] had the opportunity to challenge 
[the affiant’s] experience and expertise in the voir 
dire, but chose  not to. Nor did he rely on [the 
affiant’s] purported limited experience as a basis to 
challenge the ITO.”  Moreover, “regardless of 
personal experience, the combined effect of all the 
evidence amply supported the trial judge’s 
conclusion that [the affiant’s] subjective belief was 
objectively reasonable.”
The Arrest
As for the arrest, the Court of Appeal upheld the 
trial judge’s finding of legality. The grounds in 
support of the search warrant and the arrest mostly 
overlapped. The arresting officer’s decision was 
“generally based on the grounds set out in the 
ITO, plus his knowledge of a later occurring 
transaction.” These circumstances sufficiently 
supported the trial judge’s finding of reasonable 
grounds for arrest.
s. 10(b) Right to Counsel
The trial judge properly  concluded that there was 
no breach of the accused’s s. 10(b) right to counsel:
Police immediately provided [the accused] with 
notice of his s 10(b) rights upon his arrest 
outside of his home. He was provided with an 
opportunity to speak to counsel 13 minutes 
following his frisk search at the police  station. 
The frisk search took place 10 minutes after his 
arrival at headquarters. During that initial 10 
minutes,  police appear to have been engaged 
in routine administrative or processing work. 
Once “settled,” [the accused] was placed on a 
bench while the supervising officer awaited 
approval from [the arresting officer] to put [the 
accused] inside the phone room. This waiting 
time spanned the aforementioned 13 minutes.
The trial judge determined that the moment his 
frisk search was completed was the earliest 
possible time when he could have reasonably 
contacted a lawyer. It is this 13-minute window 
which was the focus of her decision. She 
concluded that the “minimal delay between the 
point when it was practically possible” to 
facilitate access to counsel and in fact allowing 
him to do so did not amount to a breach.
Although some version of a roadside right to 
counsel argument was raised at trial, [the 
accused] has expanded on this claim beyond 
any conceivable limit in the course of the 
present appeal. There is simply no evidentiary 
foundation to evaluate whose phone at the 
scene may have been available for use. The 
record also does not allow for the drawing of 
any inferences with respect to whether [the 
accused’s] privacy rights could have reasonably 
been protected at the scene.
Inherent in the trial judge’s decision is a 
rejection of any suggestion of a reasonable 
opportunity to contact counsel at [the 
accused’s] earlier preferred timeframe. She 
dismissed any suggestion of bad faith or 
reckless disregard for Charter compliance. The 
fact [the accused] disagrees with this 
conclusion does not entitle him to his desired 
relief on appeal. … [references omitted, paras. 
34-37]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“We reject the suggestion that an affiant to an ITO must provide a 
detailed curriculum vitae of his or her expertise akin to an expert statement of 
qualification. This degree of detail is unnecessary ...”
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LOGBOOK SEARCH NOT A 
RUSE: COCAINE ADMISSIBLE
R. v. A.B., 2021 BCCA 20  
A police officer stopped the accused, 
the operator of a commercial tractor-
trailer unit, for erratic driving. The 
off icer asked the  accused to 
produce his logbook, licence  and 
fuel receipts as required under BC’s Motor Vehicle 
Act (MVA). The logbook was produced, but there 
were no entries within the previous four days. This 
was an offence under BC’s MVA Regulations. 
The officer told the accused that he was going to be 
placed out of service for a minimum of eight hours 
and possibly up to 72 hours. He asked the officer if 
he could drive the truck a few kilometers up the 
road to a parking lot at a motel. At the parking  lot, 
the officer conducted a search of the vehicle. He 
was aware that evidence of log books might be 
concealed in the toolbox area, which was 
accessible in two ways: (1) from the exterior of the 
truck or (2) by lifting the bed in the sleeping birth of 
the truck and looking down on the toolbox.  
When he lifted the  bed, the officer saw a duffle bag 
partially  open with a brick of cocaine in it. Two 
other similar-sized bricks of cocaine weighing 
slightly more that one kilogram each were also 
found. The officer did not search the bed, the 
bedding, or clothing. The accused was arrested for 
possessing drugs for the purpose of trafficking. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
The officer testified he was aware  that 
the accused had an expectation of 
privacy with respect to the bed and the 
closet in the tractor unit. The judge 
reviewed s. 239 of BC’s MVA, s. 37.19.02(1) MVAR, 
as well as the definition of “sleeper berth” found in 
Schedule 1 MVAR. 
“I am also satisfied that [the officer] was entitled 
to search the toolbox,” said the judge. “It was not 
part of the sleeper berth. The mere fact that [the 
accused] may have stored some of his personal 
items in the toolbox does not change the  character 
of that area to become part of the sleeper berth. It 
is apparent from looking at the  contents of the 
toolbox that the items stored in it were to be used 
for the operation and maintenance of the truck.” 
The judge accepted the officer’s evidence that he 
was searching for the missing logbooks when he 
searched the truck. The search was authorized by 
statute and was carried out lawfully. The cocaine 
was admitted as evidence and the accused was 
convicted of possessing cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued, in part, 
that the warrantless search that 
u n c ove r e d t h e c o c a i n e 
e x c e e d e d t h e o f f i c e r ’s 
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authority, was unlawful and unreasonable, and 
therefore breached s. 8 of the Charter. The accused 
suggested that he had a protected expectation of 
privacy in the sleeping compartment of his 
commercial truck. In his view, the officer stepped 
out of bounds when he searched the sleeping 
compartment of the truck and lifted up the bed. 
Moreover, when the officer was conducting his 
search, the intended purpose  of the stop had 
already been satisfied. Thus, the officer no longer 
had the authority to engage in a further search of 
the vehicle  after he had determined that the 
accused was non-compliant and had decided to 
issue him a violation ticket. Consequently, the 
accused contended that the evidence out to have 
been excluded under s. 24(2) .
The Search
Under s. 239(1) MVA, “a peace officer may, 
without a warrant, search a business vehicle on a 
highway to determine whether this Act and the 
regulations are being complied with in the 
operation of that business vehicle, and for that 
purpose may require the driver of the business 
vehicle  to stop the business vehicle and permit the 
search to be made.”
Even though the officer was presented with 
incomplete  logbooks and had decided to issue a 
ticket, this did not make a search for missing 
logbooks unnecessary. Citing R. v. Nolet, 2010 SCC 
4, Justice Hunter, authoring the Court of Appeal 
decision, opined that s. 239 MVA authorized the 
officer to conduct the search. 
Further, the officer was not using the  MVA as a ruse 
to uncover drugs or guns because the accused had 
a history  of criminal activity  and had admitted his 
failure to comply with the logbook regulations. 
Here, the trial judge accepted the officer’s evidence 
that he was searching the toolbox to look for 
logbooks.
The Court of Appeal also rejected the accused’s 
assertion that the accused’s expectation of privacy 
in the sleeping compartment of the truck was 
violated when the officer accessed the toolbox by 
lifting the sleeping berth from within the cab of the 
truck, “The search of the toolbox, located below 
the sleeping berth, was not, without more, a 
violation of the [accused’s] right to be secure from 
unreasonable search or seizure,”  said Justice 
Hunter. “The toolbox where the drugs were 
located was not part of the sleeper berth such that 
the search of the toolbox can be said to have been 
in violation of s. 37.19.02(1) of the Regulations.”
Nor was entry to the area of the sleeper berth itself 
contrary to s.  37.19.02(1), thereby rendering the 
subsequent search illegal:
The implication of this argument is that the 
regulation limits the scope of the general 
statutory authority in s.  239 of the MVA to 
“search a business vehicle on a highway to 
determine whether this Act and the regulations 
are being complied with in the operation of 
that business vehicle.” I cannot agree that the 
BY THE BOOK:
BC’s Motor Vehicle Act
Power to search business vehicles
s. 239(1) A peace officer may, without 
a warrant, search a business vehicle on 
a highway to determine whether this 
Act and the regulations are being complied with 
in the operation of that business vehicle, and for 
that purpose may require the driver of the 
business vehicle to stop the business vehicle and 
permit the search to be made.
BC’s Motor Vehicle Act Regulations
Authority to enter premises for an 
inspection
s. 37.19.02(1) A peace officer may at any 
reasonable time enter or stop and enter a 
commercial motor vehicle, except for its sleeper 
berth, for the purpose of inspecting the daily logs 
and supporting documents.
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regulation has the effect of qualifying the 
general power contained in the statute.
On its face, s.  37.19.02(1) relates to an 
inspection of the daily logs and supporting 
documents, not the search for undisclosed 
logbooks. To the extent that there may be 
overlap between the authority to inspect daily 
logs of commercial motor vehicles and the 
authority to search business vehicles for 
documents evidencing non-compliance with 
regulations, I do not consider that the 
regulation could be read as prevailing over the 
general power expressed in the statute.
Accordingly, it is my view that s.  239 of the 
MVA authorized the search of the toolbox, 
notwithstanding that the police officer located 
the toolbox beneath the sleeper berth of the 
truck and notwithstanding the provisions of 
s.  37.19.02(1) of the Regulations. The law 
recognizes broad powers for search of 
commercial vehicles when the purpose of the 
search is regulatory oversight. ... [references 
omitted, paras. 30-32]
The trial judge did not err in admitting the  cocaine 
as evidence and the accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
FAILURE OF POLICE TO 
UNDERSTAND s. 10(b) A 
SERIOUS MATTER
R. v. Mann, 2021 ONCA 103
After calling 911 from a home and 
telling the dispatcher that he had 
killed his “so called girlfriend” by 
choking and beating her to death, the 
accused was arrested at the scene 
without incident. The victim was not in fact dead, 
but suffered life-threatening and permanent 
injuries, including brain damage, from the attack.
The arresting officer immediately turned the 
accused over to two other officers. Prior to being 
placed in the police car, the accused made some 
spontaneous incriminating utterances. Then, upon 
being placed in the police car, the accused was 
told he was under arrest for aggravated assault and 
advised of his right to counsel and cautioned. The 
accused indicated that he understood and said that 
he had no lawyer in town, but that he would speak 
with duty  counsel. He was subsequently charged 
with attempted murder and aggravated assault. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The two officers taking custody of the 
accused from the arresting officer 
testified. One of the officers said he 
asked the accused whether he had been 
stabbed because he had blood on his clothes. After 
answering “no”, the  accused spontaneously stated 
that he was planning to kill himself with a knife that 
night, but it was too dull. He said that the knife was 
in the centre console of his vehicle that was parked 
outside of the residence and there was also a 
suicide note. The other officer testified that the 
accused’s statements began while  the officers were 
walking him out of the residence and on their way 
to the police car. These utterances included: “she 
just pissed me off”; “I just lost it on her”; “I just 
snapped”; and “I tried to commit suicide tonight 
with my knife but it wasn't sharp enough. I tried it 
on my hands.”
The judge found it was reasonable for the officer to 
ask the accused whether he  had been stabbed since 
there  was blood on him. But the judge found the 
accused’s s. 10(b) Charter  rights had been breached 
when he had not been informed of his right to 
counsel at the first opportunity, which was before 
he was placed in the  police car. In the judge’s view, 
between five to 10 minutes had elapsed between 
the accused’s detention and the time that he was 
removed from the home. 
Nevertheless, the judge concluded that the 
evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2). 
First, the breach was not deliberate or so serious 
that the court needed to disassociate itself from 
police conduct. Second, because the accused 
made more serious, self-incriminating remarks 
when he called 911, the impact on his rights was 
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“tempered significantly”. Finally, even though the 
exclusion of this statements “would not 
significantly undermine the prosecution’s case”, 
the evidence was “highly  relevant”  to the issue of 
intent. The accused was convicted of attempted 
murder and sentenced to life  imprisonment. He 
was also found guilty  of aggravated assault but this 
conviction was stayed on the basis that a person 
should not be subjected to more than one 
conviction arising out of the same delict.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused contended, 
among other things, that the 
trial judge erred in admitting 
the statement he made to 
police at the time of his arrest. The Court of Appeal 
agreed. finding the trial judge erred in her analysis 
of all three admissibility factors: 
... First, as found by the trial judge, the officers 
delayed in providing the [accused] with his 
rights to counsel. The fact that the officers did 
not do so deliberately does not lessen the 
nature of the breach. It simply does not 
aggravate it. The officers did not offer any 
explanation for the delay. The crime scene was 
being adequately handled by the many other 
officers who were on scene (including two 
sergeants) and the victim was being treated by 
paramedics.
The right to counsel is an extremely important 
right. Persons who are detained by the police 
may need immediate advice and counsel. ...
It is not up to the police to decide when they 
will get around to providing rights to a person 
whom they have arrested. The failure of the 
police to understand this basic proposition is a 
serious matter and must be treated as such 
when it is breached. [references omitted, paras. 
29-31]
Moreover, the Charter breach and the extraction of 
the statements was not “tempered” because the 
police had other evidence of a similar type  that was 
properly obtained (the 911 call). “The maxim ‘no 
harm, no foul’ has little place in the assessment of 
a violation of constitutionally protected interests,” 
said Justice Nordheimer. As well, the impugned 
statements were given prominence in the trial 
judge’s final instructions to the jury and in the 
Crown’s closing submissions. Finally, it was 
inconsistent to hold that the impact of the evidence 
was lessened because there was other similar 
evidence while  at the same time finding  it was 
“highly re levant” and necessary to the 
prosecution’s case.
The Court of Appeal overturned the  trial judge’s 
decision on her s. 24(2) analysis and ruled the 
accused’s statements inadmissible from any new 
trial. The accused’s appeal was allowed and his 
conviction on attempted murder and the finding of 
guilt on aggravated assault was set aside. A new 
trial was ordered on both offences.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Note-able Quote
“A leader is one you knows the way, 
goes the way and shows the way.”
~John C. Maxwell~
“The right to counsel is an extremely important right. Persons who are detained 
by the police may need immediate advice and counsel. ... It is not up to the police 
to decide when they will get around to providing rights to a person whom they 
have arrested. The failure of the police to understand this basic proposition is a 
serious matter and must be treated as such when it is breached.”
“The maxim ‘no harm, no foul’ has 
little place in the assessment of a 
violation of constitutionally 
protected interests.” 
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2020 BC ILLICT DRUG TOXICITY 
DEATHS ALREADY OUTPACE 
PREVIOUS YEAR
The Office of BC’s Chief Coroner has released 
statistics for illicit drug  toxicity deaths (formerly 
known as illicit drug overdose deaths) in the 
province from January 1, 2010 to December 
31, 2020. In December 2020 there were 152 
suspected drug toxicity deaths. This represents a 
+130% increase over the number of deaths 
occurring in December 2019 (66).
In 2020, there were a total of 1,716 suspected drug 
overdose deaths from January to December. This 
represents an increase of 732 deaths over the 2019 
numbers for the same time period (984). 
People aged 30-39 and 40-49 were the hardest hit 
in 2020 with 404  illicit drug toxicity deaths in each 
age  range, followed by 50-59 year-olds (383) and 
19-29 years-old (305).  There were 183  deaths 
among people aged 60-69 had while  those under 
19 years had 19 deaths. Vancouver had the most 
deaths at 408 followed by  Surrey (214), Victoria 
(122), Abbotsford (65), Kelowna (61), and 
Kamloops with 60.   
Overall, the 2020 statistics amount to almost five 
(5) people dying every day of the year.
Males continue to die at about a 4:1  ratio 
compared to females. From January to December 
2020, 1,392 males had 
died while  there were 
324 female deaths.
The January to December 
2020 data indicated that 
most illicit drug toxicity 
deaths (84%) occurred 
i n s i d e w h i l e 1 4 % 
occurred outside. For 27 
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“Private residence” includes residences, driveways, 
garages, trailer homes.
“Other residence” includes hotels, motels, rooming 
houses, shelters, etc.
“Other inside” includes facilities, occupational sites, 
public buildings and businesses.
“ O u t s i d e ” 
includes vehicles, 
streets, sidewalks, 
pa rks , wooded 
a r e a s , 
campgrounds and 
parking lots.
DEATHS SINCE PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY
In April 2016, BC’s provincial health officer 
declared a public health emergency in response to 
the rise in drug overdoses and deaths. The number 
of overdose deaths in the 57 months preceding the 
declaration (Jul 2011 - Mar 2016) totaled 1,872. 
The number of deaths in the 57 months following 
the declaration (Apr 2016 - Dec 2020) totaled 










Deaths by location: Jan-Sep 2020
Source: Illicit Drug Toxicity Deaths in BC - January 1, 2010 to 
December 31, 2020.  Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor 
General, Coroners Service. February 11, 2021.
TYPES OF DRUGS
The top five detected drugs relevant to illicit drug overdose deaths from 2017 - 2020 were  fentanyl and its 
analogues, which was detected in 86.8%  of deaths, cocaine (49.4%), methamphetamine/amphetamine 
(35.2%), ethyl alcohol (28.1%) and benzodiazepines (4.3%). Other opioids (29.8%) and other stimulants 







































































by Township with 50 or 

















Volume 21 Issue 1 ~ January/February 2021
PAGE 40
ASSAULTS AGAINST PEACE 
OFFICERS ON THE RISE
In December 2020 BC’s Ministry of Public Safety 
and Solicitor General Policing and Security Branch 
released Crime Trends data for 2010-2019. Data 
indicates assaults against peace officers were up 
from 2018 to 2019. 
Theft Under $5,000 Most Common 
Offence
Theft under $5,000 was the most common offence 
reported to BC police  in 2019. This was followed 
by mischief, disturbing the peace, and assaults 
(level 1).
Assaults Against Peace Officers
Year 2016 2017 2018 2019
Number 1,254 1,280 1,440 1,536
Clearance 
Rate
98.4% 95.5% 96.9% 96.7%
Cleared by 
Charge
987 933 1,111 1,127
Cleared 
Otherwise
247 290 285 358
Persons 
Charged
778 765 882 879
2019 Top Seven BC Offences
Offence Number Cleared Persons 
Charged
Theft under $5,000 133,213 15,068 7,041
Mischief 55,610 10,373 1,763
Disturbing Peace 51,851 14,085 817
Assault Level 1 29,362 16,340 9,244




Fraud 22,816 2,535 1,617















Nanaimo Mun 100,217 163.2 16,355 2,251 9,784 4,320 0 280
Kelowna Mun 142,162 128.7 18,298 2,510 12,075 3,713 1 738
Kamloops Mun 100,046 119.9 11,991 2,236 7,515 2,240 3 286
Victoria Mun 112,721 117.9 13,292 2,607 8,827 1,858 0 279
Vancouver Mun 687,664 84.1 57,865 8,748 43,975 5,142 12 1,389
Langley Township Mun 131,561 78.4 10,312 1,528 6,691 2,093 0 593
Surrey Mun 584,851 77.7 45,431 8,609 26,439 10,383 19 1,730
Burnaby Mun 253,007 65.2 16,494 2,394 11,383 2,717 1 527
Abbotsford Mun 158,582 60.7 9,633 1,880 6,973 780 1 613
Richmond Mun 212,276 58.3 12,383 1,877 8,000 2,506 2 313
Coquitlam Mun 149,959 53.4 8,006 1,212 5,037 1,757 2 262
Delta Mun 110,443 47.6 5,258 1,005 3,392 861 0 150
Saanich Mun 122,173 41.7 5,099 1,031 3,646 422 0 69
** per 100,000 residents. Source:  British Columbia Policing Jurisdiction Crime Trends, 2010 - 2019
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 Homicides Remain Stable
There was no change in the  number of homicides 
from 2018 to 2019. In both years there were 90 
homicides in BC.
Independent Police Forces
Only  one jurisdiction policed by an independent 
police force (Abbotsford) saw a reduction in 
Criminal Code offences. All others saw an increase.
2019 C.C. Offences Change: Independent Police Forces
Police
Jurisdiction










2018 2019 2018>2019 2018 2019 2018>2019
Abbotsford Mun 10,198 9,633 -5.5% 60.7 Port Moody Mun 1,019 1,049 +2.9 29.9
Central Saanich Mun 480 493 +2.7% 27.3 Saanich Mun 4,650 5,099 +9.7% 41.7
Delta Mun 4,512 5,258 +1.7 47.6 Vancouver Mun 55,178 57,865 +4.9% 84.1
Nelson Mun 792 858 +8.3 75.5 Victoria Mun 11,747 13,292 +13.2% 117.9
New Westminster Mun 5,054 5,629 +11.4 70.6 West Vancouver Mun 2,429 2,459 +1.2% 52.2
Oak Bay Mun 535 627 +17.2% 33.8 ** per 100,000 residents.
2019 C.C. Offences Change: Jurisdictions Over 100,000
Police
Jurisdiction




Total Criminal  Code 
Offences
Change
2018 2019 2018>2019 2018 2019 2018>2019
Nanaimo Mun 10,999 16,355 +48.7% Coquitlam Mun 7,177 8,006 +11.6%
Burnaby Mun 13,149 16,494 +25.4% Saanich Mun 4,650 5,099 +9.7%
Kelowna Mun 14,717 18,298 +24.3% Surrey Mun 41,907 45,431 +8.4%
Kamloops Mun 10,157 11,991 +18.1% Vancouver Mun 55,178 57,865 +4.9%
Delta Mun 4,512 5,258 +16.5% Richmond Mun 11,947 12,383 +3.6%
Langley Township Mun 9,000 10,312 +14.6% Abbotsford Mun 10,198 9,633 -5.5%
Victoria Mun 11,747 13,292 +13.2%
Crime Up In Populous Cities
Only  one police jurisdiction with a population of 
more than 100,000 residents (Abbotsford) saw a 
decrease in Criminal Code offences. 
All other jurisdictions with a population of more 
than 100,000 saw an increase in Criminal Code 
offences. This ranged from a low of a +3.6% 
increase to a high of a +48.7%.
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PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR 
CONVICTION NOT REQUIRED 
WHEN MAKING AN ARREST
R. v. Orr, 2021 BCCA 42
Police initiated an investigation into 
t h e a c c u s e d a f t e r r e c e i v i n g 
information from three  confidential 
informers that he  was trafficking in 
drugs. During the investigation, 
surveillance was conducted over six days in or near 
the apartment building in which the accused lived. 
Police also had complaints from tenants of the 
apartment building about the accused trafficking in 
drugs. While conducting their surveillance, the 
police made 10  observations that were consistent 
with drug trafficking, including three occasions 
where  the accused was seen leaving the  apartment 
building and getting into a vehicle for a short 
period. On five occasions, people  known or 
suspected to be involved in the drug trade entered 
the building at the accused’s invitation and 
remained there for short periods. On two 
occasions, police saw people who left the 
accused’s company conduct a  hand-to-hand 
transaction with someone else or get into a vehicle 
for a short period. The accused was also observed 
using a  key to enter an apartment. As well, the 
management company for the accused’s apartment 
building confirmed he was a tenant in the building.
The police obtained a warrant to search the 
accused’s apartment. The Information to Obtain 
(ITO) included the informer information, the 
complaints by other residents of the apartment 
bui ld ing, observat ions made dur ing the 
surveillance, and the  management company’s 
confirmation of the accused’s tenancy. As well, the 
ITO contained the accused’s criminal record, 
including a  prior conviction for possessing drugs for 
the purpose of trafficking and three convictions for 
weapons offences. The ITO also indicated that the 
police had conducted a previous search of the 
accused’s residence (at a different location) three 
years earlier. At that time, 14.9  grams of cocaine, 
11.8 grams of heroin, two cell phones and $1,128 
in cash were found. 
The following day the lead investigator directed the 
accused’s arrest for possession of cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking. He was arrested by the 
Emergency Response Team (ERT) away from his 
apartment in the parking lot of an auto parts store. 
He was searched incidental to the arrest. After the 
arrest, the police executed the search warrant using 
the keys found in the accused’s possession to open 
the apartment door. During the search, police 
found drugs and other evidence, and a prohibited 
weapon - a push dagger. Eight days after the  search 
warrant was executed the accused was charged 
with various drug and weapons offences. An 
unendorsed warrant was issued for his arrest and it 
was executed about three months later. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
The accused argued several of his 
Charter  rights had been breached, 
including s. 9. He submitted his 
warrantless arrest was arbitrary because 
it was not supported by reasonable grounds. He 
wanted the evidence excluded under s. 24(2). 
Only  one  witness - a sergeant - testified about the 
warrantless arrest. He was a  supervisor with the 
Strike Force unit, had worked in an undercover 
capacity in street drug investigations and had eight 
years experience with an emergency response 
What police found:
• 30 pills containing ketamine and fentanyl.
• 15.4  grams of “pebbled heroin and 
fentanyl”;
• 122 grams of caffeine;
• Multiple score sheets;
• Working digital scale;




• Six knives including a prohibited push 
dagger; and
• Baton.
Volume 21 Issue 1 ~ January/February 2021
PAGE 43
team. He had also been qualified by a court to give 
expert opinion evidence as a “drug expert”, had 
specialized training in controlled substances, and 
had experience recruit ing and managing 
confidential informers and in surveillance 
techniques. The sergeant also personally 
participated in the surveillance of the accused as 
part of the drug  investigation. On the day before 
the accused’s arrest, the sergeant concluded that 
police should arrest the accused for drug offences 
and apply for a warrant to search his residence. He 
relayed his conclusion to other officers and they 
took steps to effect the arrest. 
The judge found the warrantless arrest was lawful. 
Not only did the police officers effecting  the arrest 
honestly believe that he was, at the time of his 
arrest, in possession of a controlled substance for 
the purpose of trafficking, the information known to 
police at the time of the arrest objectively justified 
it.  The evidence was admitted and the accused was 
convicted on two charges of possessing drugs for 
the purpose of trafficking and possessing a 
prohibited weapon.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among 
other things, that the trial 
judge erred  in finding there 
were objectively reasonable 
grounds for his warrantless arrest. He did not 
challenge the sergeant’s subjective belief that he 
possessed a  controlled substance for the purpose of 
trafficking. But he submitted that any such 
subjective belief was not objectively reasonable. 
The accused said there was no evidence he was 
involved in an actual hand-to-hand drug 
transaction. Rather, he asserted the observations 
made of him were equally consistent with lawful 
activity. And no observations were made of him 
inside his apartment engaged in drug  transactions 
with the  people who entered. He contended that 
police knowledge and experience in drug 
trafficking investigations could not make up for the 
lack of objective support for an arrest.
The Crown, on the other hand, suggested the police 
had the necessary  objective reasonable grounds to 
believe the accused had committed or was about to 
commit a criminal of fence. Surveil lance 
observations, other information available, and the 
sergeant’s knowledge and experience as a drug 
investigator justified the warrantless arrest. 
Justice DeWitt-Van Oosten described the power of 
arrest under s.  495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code as 
involving a two-part test: 
• the arresting  officer must subjectively believe 
that the person arrested had committed or was 
about to commit an indictable offence; and
• the officer’s grounds for their belief must be 
objectively reasonable. 
Citing other cases, she also noted the following:
• An officer’s training and experience are relevant 
in assessing objective reasonableness. 
• There need not be a prima facie case  for 
conviction before an arrest without a warrant is 
made.
• The reasonable grounds standard requires 
something more than mere suspicion, but 
something less than the standard applicable in 
civil matters of proof on the balance of 
probabilities.
• Determining whether reasonable and probable 
grounds exist requires an assessment of the 
“totality of the circumstances”.
In upholding the trial judge’s conclusion that the 
officer had reasonable grounds to justify the arrest, 
Justice DeWitt-Van Oosten stated:
In this case, the trial judge found a subjective 
belief that the [accused] was in possession of 
one or more controlled substances for 
trafficking. In my view, he also correctly found 
there was an objectively reasonable basis for 
that belief. The totality of the circumstances 
known to police, including: the past 
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involvement in drug offences; the concerns 
expressed by other tenants in his building; the 
information received from confidential 
informers; the observations made of the 
[accused] and people interacting with him; and 
[the sergeant’s] knowledge and experience with 
drug trafficking investigations generally, 
provided a credibly-based probability of 
p o s s e s s i o n a n d t r a f f i c k i n g . Po l i c e 
acknowledged they did not see the [accused] in 
phys ica l possess ion o f ac tua l drugs , 
transporting them, or distributing them to other 
individuals. However, [the sergeant] was 
entitled to inform the inferences he drew about 
the [accused’s] conduct with reference to the 
other information in his possession. As the 
Crown has appropriately emphasized in the 
appeal, it is the cumulative effect of the 
information known to police that matters. 
Individual pieces of evidence adduced on the 
evidentiary voir dire may carry the possibility of 
alternative (and innocent) inferences. However, 
the evidence in support of a warrantless arrest 
is “not [to be] assessed on a piece meal basis”. 
[reference omitted, para. 78]
The officer had an honestly  held belief that was 
objectively reasonable. There was no s. 9 breach. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
BC’s 15 Highest Crime Rates: 2019
Policing Jurisdiction Crime 
Rate
Population
Tsay Keh Dene Prov 592.3 596
Takla Landing Prov 331.7 202
Williams Lake Mun 290.8 11,359
Terrace Mun 289.7 12,594
Quesnel Mun 286.2 10,392
Port Hardy Prov 260.6 5,587
Fort St James  Prov 254.3 4,431
Prince George Mun 234.1 81,323
Duncan Prov 232.7 16,036
Hope Mun 230.5 6,667
Prince Rupert Mun 225.4 13,054
Merritt Mun 221.9 7,727
Penticton Mun 218.9 36,425
Agassiz Prov 205.0 3,902
Langley City Mun 197.6 27,718
Source:   British Columbia Policing Jurisdiction Crime Trends, 2010 - 2019
“In Service: 10-8”
Sign-up Now
Are you interested in regularly receiving the In 
Service: 10-8 newsletter by email. You can sign 
up by clicking here and then clicking on the 
“Sign up” link.
This “Sign up” link will take you to the free 
Subscription Form that only requires an email. 
